Submitted by Nolan Nelson, Apr 7, 2007 00:33

The British captain created an international incident by failing to respond aggressively to the Iranian's when his command was threatened with capture. The very first responsibility of any allied naval commander in international waters anywhere is to use all means available to maintain the principle of Freedom of the Seas, regardless of other specific instructions. This responsibility extends to other allied shipping and neutral vessels as well as his/her own command.

In this day of instantaneous communication, the fact he did not fight his command means senior commanders and politicians, including some masquerading in military uniforms, failed miserably. Since Iran is a terrorist state, the first evolution practiced by Coalition task force units must be the continuum of responses to Iranian provocations in the Persian Gulf and Straits of Hormuz. The Iranian boats did not materialize alongside the British, but had to employ a variety of intrigues to which there should have been timely, practiced responses.

This incident transfers sea superiority from Coalition forces, including three U.S. carrier battle groups, to Iranian forces deploying a few coastal defense vessels. Now every merchant captain should ask, "If you will not defend your own ships, how can I rely upon you, if Iranian piratical actions place me in harms way? How do I know you will not ignore my radio communications and flashing lights when I am is trouble" Recovering superiority now necessitates employing revised actions more quickly escalating to use of deadly force.

Nolan Nelson

3497 Westward Ho

Eugene, Oregon 97401

541-344-7853

P.S.

Been there, but thank God I did not have to do it. When our LST headed down to IV Corp for Vietnam deployment we were routed through the Taiwan Straits for patrol, because the Navy no longer had a destroyer flotilla based in Taipei. The captain made it crystal clear we would not be taken like the Pueblo was by the North Koreans in January 1968, but would fight the ship. Three open 3"50 cal. gun mounts were not the Navy's best idea for functional armament at sea. Besides them we had six 50cal. machine guns and small arms for 20% of the crew.

Note: Comments are screened, and in some cases edited, before posting. We reserve the right to reject anything we find objectionable.