Iraq Surge Should Overwhelm Enemy
President Bush is about to launch a final push in Iraq with a large reinforcement of American troops in the hope of crushing the insurgency before America embarks on a large-scale withdrawal of forces from the country.
The size of the force is commonly set at between 40,000 and 50,000 troops. The aim of this surge will be to inflict severe damage upon the problem-making elements inside Iraq, including both Shiite and Sunni militias, and to increase training of the Iraqi security forces under American supervision.
Some argue that the surge might exacerbate the violence without deterring the perpetrators from their attacks and that it might result in a sharp increase in American casualties with no observable gain. Others argue that it is defeatist to concentrate on withdrawal from Iraq without trying a last time to make military force work.
A major consideration is the availability of troops. Some formations of the regular American Army and National Guard remain within America, but many have already been deployed to Iraq, and it may prove difficult to find the necessary soldiers. Another challenge is the task of transporting them and their equipment to the fighting zones. How are they to be moved, and where are they to be based?
Despite the current deployment to Iraq and the number of units and formations elsewhere in the world, specifically in Afghanistan, the Army and Marine Corps still maintain a large deployable reserve in America. There should be no difficulty in finding an Army, Marine, or National Guard division.
Its equipment could be transported in the designated huge transport vehicles of its C-lift reserve fleet, while the personnel could be flown by the vast fleet of C-5 transports. The obvious point of entry is Kuwait, as it was for the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Military logic requires that any reinforcements should contain a large number of armored vehicles. Insurgents, though they have had some success in attacking tanks and armored fighting vehicles, are not properly equipped to resist a heavily armored enemy.
The surge deployment should overwhelm the insurgents with a sudden concentration, both of numbers, armored vehicles and firepower, inflicting severe losses and heavy shock. The Mahdi Army in Sadr City should prove vulnerable to such tactics, which would of course be supported by helicopters and fixed-wing aviation.
So far, most military activity by coalition forces has been reactive rather than unilateral. Typically, units have become involved in firefights while on patrol or on convoy protection duties. During the surge, the additional troops would take the fight to the enemy, doing him harm, destabilizing him and his leaders, and damaging or destroying the bases from which he operates.
The cost of such tactics is likely to be high but not unbearable if enough armored vehicles are used to protect the attacking troops. The advantage of committing recently arrived troops to such operations is that they will come to operations fresh and enthusiastic. While they may not be familiar with local conditions or topography, this need not be a disqualification since the purpose of a surge strike would be to create shock, not to alter local conditions by informal action.
The British contingent recently demonstrated that such overwhelming tactics have their effect. After their surprise move into Basra with massed columns of fighting vehicles and Challenger tanks, they succeeded in dominating the chosen area and evoking respect from the local militias.
In any case, the sending of such force will be a necessary start to any reduction in strength. Retreat is a complicated operation, which paradoxically involves far more troops if it is to be done successfully. The enemy is tempted to interpret the withdrawal as an indication of weakness, and so risks inflicting passing shots and farewell attacks. It is vastly important to have additional troops on hand.
The surge reinforcements therefore may have a dual purpose of covering the reduction and dealing a final blow at the source of the disorder before departure. American commanders certainly will not wish to leave Iraq with their tails between their legs. Therefore, we may expect to see the number of American troops in the theater increase suddenly to between 150,000 and 200,000, if only for a short time.
Western leaders will hope that an important side effect of the surge will be to increase the size and capability of Iraqi security forces, which will be vital for the operation.
The stability of Iraq and its elected government will depend on them when the size of Western involvement is reduced.
