On January 3, 2020, the Trump administration conducted a drone strike that killed the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, decapitating the elite unit responsible for Iran’s foreign operations including the oversight of proxy militias and extraterritorial military engagements.

In the nearly six years since his death, Tehran’s foreign-operations arm has been able to expand its wealth, political influence, and visibility across the Middle East. Its networks of proxy militias and regional allies are still active, and its integration into Iran’s domestic economy has deepened, giving it greater institutional resilience. 

Yet analysts and insiders alike note that the Quds Force’s cohesion, reputation, and operational edge have weakened without Mr. Soleimani’s personal leadership, exposing cracks in what was once a tightly coordinated regional apparatus. 

“The Quds Force has really suffered, as a brand,” the executive director of The Soufan Center, Colin Clarke, tells The New York Sun. “Soleimani’s entire ‘Axis of Resistance’ project is now in shambles, with its crown jewel, Lebanese Hezbollah, reeling from the past two years of war against Israel. Soleimani’s successor, Esmail Qaani, by all accounts, has been a failed leader.”

The “Axis of Resistance” was Mr. Soleimani’s strategic vision for a network of Iran-aligned militias, political actors, and allied governments designed to counter the United States, Israel, and Western influence across the Middle East. 

It sought to expand Tehran’s regional power through a combination of proxy warfare, economic leverage, and political infiltration – tying groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and beyond into a coordinated front that could project Iranian influence without direct conventional military engagement.

The Apparent Continuity of Power

Mr. Soleimani’s death was acknowledged by Iran as a significant blow, and cast by Washington as a disruption of Tehran’s regional operations. While critics and analysts in the West feared the outbreak of an all-out war that never materialized, the Quds Force moved seamlessly in the immediate aftermath to install deputy commander Esmail Qaani as the new commander, ensuring continuity of command.

Under Mr. Qaani, the Quds Force has appeared to pursue the same combination of clandestine influence operations, proxy militia coordination, and extraterritorial paramilitary support. However, even insiders quietly concede that the landscape has fundamentally changed.

“Qaani doesn’t come as often, and it is not the same,” one Iraq-based, Iran-backed militia leader known as Sheikh Katib tells the Sun. “We like to express it that it is like a difference between a small boat and a big boat.”

Even today, Iran and its proxies cite Mr. Soleimani’s legacy when launching missile strikes, supporting militia networks, or projecting influence into Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

Deeper Integration at Home, Greater Visibility Abroad

One of the notable trends since Mr. Soleimani’s death is the further embedding of the IRGC – and thereby the Quds Force – into Iran’s political economy and domestic structures. 

The specialized force has become deeply involved in Iran’s economy by securing no-bid state contracts through its engineering arm Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters; controlling smuggling networks of fuel, oil, and other goods that generate hundreds of millions to billions of dollars in hard currency; and operating a web of front companies and foundations that shield its financial operations and deepen its political power.

Externally, the Quds Force has engaged more openly in missile strikes, drone campaigns, and leadership targeting – often in coordination with its proxies. The network-type model built under Mr. Soleimani has been sustained, and in some cases, it has been scaled. However, the rising visibility has increased exposure and therefore risk.

Cracks in the Shadow Army

Beneath this seeming continuity, key vulnerabilities are emerging. Several expert analyses suggest the Quds Force has lost some of the intangible advantages it held under Mr. Soleimani – namely his personal charisma, relationships with regional militia partners, and reputation for operational daring.

“His death has affected us a lot. Qassam was our Jihadi father,” Sheikh Katib said. “He was the faithful Qassem Soleimani. He was a person we loved very much; even his enemies who met him came to love him.”

He also pointed out that “Qassem would come and say hello to the leaders, but then he also said hello to the cooks and cleaners; he would kiss them, he was a supporter of the oppressed.”

Mr. Soleimani, particularly during the war against ISIS, managed even to win support from some in the Iraqi Christian community as he personally took to the battlefield to drive the Sunni terrorist group from their ancient land.

“He just had a way with people,” one Christian fighter, who did not want to be identified for safety reasons, tells the Sun. “He made people feel important and want to follow his lead.”

The Iranian militia leader, however, was as brutal as they come. United States officials blame him for orchestrating proxy attacks that killed more than 600 American troops in Iraq and for directing militia campaigns marked by assassinations, bombings, and sectarian violence across the region.

Mr. Soleimani also directed Iran’s proxy strategy against Israel, arming and funding Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and other militant groups responsible for rocket attacks, cross-border raids, and assassinations. This campaign entrenched Iran’s presence along Israel’s borders and fueled years of deadly confrontation.

Some critics have suggested that, without his leadership, the Quds Force struggles for relevance and operates without the operational and moral authority Mr. Soleimani enjoyed.

“Qaani is far less charismatic, less respected, less feared,” Mr. Clarke said. “Soleimani left big shoes to fill, and Qaani has not lived up to filling those shoes.”

The Quds Force thus faces three interlinked challenges: diminished leadership credibility under Mr. Qaani; operational setbacks as its more overt posture leaves proxy networks exposed to Israeli, United States, and Gulf counter-measures; and growing internal fractures as its expanding network and domestic influence pull in actors with competing loyalties.

Once a covert elite force, the Quds Force has evolved into a sprawling political-military institution – a shift that complicates its mission and exposes new vulnerabilities.

What the Shift Means for Washington

Still, for America’s national security and Middle East policy, the evolution of Iran’s Quds Force carries new risks. Once operating under Mr. Soleimani with a degree of deniability, the force now acts more openly, signaling Tehran’s readiness for aggression.

Targeted strikes on leaders or network nodes are also less effective, as the Quds Force has become a deeply institutionalized arm of the regime that can survive leadership losses.

At the same time, growing friction between the Quds Force, the IRGC’s domestic branches, and the Supreme Leader’s office could reshape its priorities – pushing it toward internal consolidation or more defensive regional operations.

Soleimani’s death “is a huge loss. He was a very sophisticated planner. He was a very highly respected figure who was able to keep all the different components of the Axis of Resistance working well together, not fighting in the sandbox,” a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, Matthew Levitt, tells the Sun. “His successors are not as capable.”

Yet, Mr. Levitt points out that even after setbacks, including the 12-day war against Israel, the force is a significant threat. 

“They’re not 10 feet tall, but they’re still very dangerous in some ways, maybe more so because they’re out for vengeance,” he said. 

Ultimately, nearly six years after Mr. Soleimani’s death, Iran’s Quds Force is entrenched and influential but faces its toughest test yet.

It has grown richer and more institutionalized, yet lost the mythic leadership, strategic agility, and regional awe that once defined it. Increasingly exposed to counter-measures and internal strains, the force is still formidable but also more predictable, vulnerable, and constrained.

For Washington’s policymakers, recognizing this evolution is key to recalibrating strategy toward Iran and its proxy network.

“The way to think about countering the Quds Force is through containment,” Mr. Clarke said. “It is already listed and treated as a foreign terrorist organization.

“I would be wary of QF-backed plots in the West, since Iran’s comparative advantage is not conventional warfare against superior foes, but rather, asymmetric warfare, including ‘old school’ terrorism.”