Are Syria’s Larger-Than-Expected Chemical Weapons Stockpiles America’s Problem?
‘President Trump and past administrations have consistently warned that rogue states like Syria conceal their capabilities, and the evidence points to additional undisclosed stockpiles,’ one expert says.

A ghostly fog drifted over Khan Shaykhun in northern Syria on April 4, 2017, bringing with it the unmistakable signs of a chemical attack. Victims collapsed in the streets, choking and foaming at the mouth. Medics rushed to treat hundreds, some evacuating the wounded across the border into Turkey — though most remained, unable to escape.
At least 89 people were killed, many before reaching medical help. More than 500 sustained injuries. Doctors suspected sarin, a deadly nerve agent, as patients showed signs of respiratory failure and eye burns. Volunteer responders used fire hoses to wash the chemicals from bodies, and images of lifeless children piled in hospitals shocked the world.
It was one of the deadliest chemical attacks in Syria’s civil war — an atrocity with no warning and, for many, no way out. But it was hardly an anomaly.
“The 100 sites are merely the tip of the iceberg; Assad’s regime has a well-documented history of deception, and the OPCW’s track record suggests they’ve underestimated the scope,” managing director of strategic advocacy firm Nestpoint Associates, John Thomas, tells the New York Sun, referring to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the leading international body that tracks chemical weapons worldwide.
“President Trump and past administrations have consistently warned that rogue states like Syria conceal their capabilities, and the evidence points to additional undisclosed stockpiles — likely buried in remote locations beyond current detection.”
Throughout the 14-year civil war that enveloped Syria, the then-government led by dictator Bashar al-Assad is reported to have carried out more than 300 chemical attacks on opposition strongholds, claiming the lives of more than 1,400 people.
Recent findings, however, suggest that the former regime’s chemical weapons stockpile was far more extensive than previously thought.
The OPCW claimed this week that there are more than 100 sites involved in the research, manufacturing and housing of chemical weapons left in the wake of Mr. Assad’s fall from power in December.
The security and condition of these newly discovered sites is not yet unclear.
Extensive Use of Chemical Weapons
In 2012, President Obama declared that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would cross a “red line” and trigger U.S. military action. But when the Assad regime used chemical weapons in 2013, killing hundreds, Mr. Obama chose not to strike.
Instead, a deal was brokered with Russia, in which Syria agreed to surrender its chemical weapons stockpile despite denying the use of the widely forbidden ordinance.
While Damascus did acknowledge 27 sites and handed over some materials, it later became clear that not all weapons were disclosed or destroyed, and chemical attacks continued in the years that followed. The government executed such attacks at least through to 2019 and is accused of carrying out 98 percent of the chemical assaults that took place throughout the Syrian turmoil.
In 2017, Brig. Gen. Zaher al-Sakat, formerly the Syrian Army’s chemical weapons chief, told this reporter that there was no chance that Mr. Assad would ever “completely give up” his chemical arsenal. Mr. Sakat revealed he was personally ordered to disseminate phosgene and chlorine gas in 2013 but refused, replacing the canisters with water and bleach.
“I just could not gas my people,” he said.
Fearing for his life after his son was detained to pressure him, Sakat fled Syria in April 2013. Now living in Europe, he alleges that Syria has long produced deadly agents, concealed them in civilian areas, and collaborated with Iran and Hezbollah to expand its chemical weapons program.
The Assad regime is believed to have used all three major chemical agents — sarin, chlorine, and mustard gas. While sarin is outright banned, chlorine is harder to regulate due to its common industrial uses, and all three cause horrific injuries or death.
The shelf life of these agents varies significantly depending on how they are stored, purity, stabilizers used, and environmental conditions. When stabilized, sarin can last for several years, sulfur can last for decades, and chlorine can last for centuries if stored properly.
The stakes for existing stockpiles not yet expired are dangerously high and could inflict significant damage. As violence flares again in Syria’s coastal regions, the potential for renewed chemical attacks poses a grave threat — not only to civilians on the ground but to regional stability and U.S. interests in the Middle East.
Although on a much smaller scale than the regime, the Islamic State terrorist organization also carried out a number of attacks on Syrian soil throughout the war, raising alarm that non-state actors could get access to the depositories. Further complicating the situation is that Syria’s interim leadership, Hayat Tahir al-Sham, is itself a United States Foreign Terrorist Organization with past ties to al Qaeda.
Taking Action
This all begs the question: what happens next?
In response to suspected chemical attacks by the Syrian government — first in Khan Sheikhoun in 2017, which killed over 100 people, and then in Douma in 2018, where at least 43 died — President Trump ordered missile strikes aimed at crippling the regime’s chemical weapons infrastructure.
Israel is also in the fray, launching its own airstrikes on Syrian facilities believed to house chemical weapons, though it’s unclear how effective those strikes were in eliminating the arsenal.
“Israel will likely act to destroy key facilities if intelligence indicates a persistent threat. The Trump administration should assist Israel if necessary,” security-focused research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Andrea Stricker, tells the Sun.
“If Israel has reliable intelligence and can eliminate remaining chemical weapons assets and facilities, it should bomb them and ask questions later. It will be doing the world a service to prevent these from falling into the hands of former jihadists who may try to use or sell them in the future.”
Mr. Thomas stressed that Syria’s chemical weapons program has been fueled by adversarial states like Iran and North Korea and said that “America needs a maximum pressure campaign through crippling sanctions, strategic deterrence and doubling down on economic isolation of these suppliers, paired with robust interdiction efforts.”
“But the United States should not bear the burden of cleaning up Syria’s mess — President Trump’s doctrine was clear: America’s resources are for Americans first,” he continued. “We can provide targeted intelligence and limited support to allies like Israel, but the heavy lifting should fall to regional powers and the OPCW, whose mandate this is, rather than entangling us in another costly overseas commitment.”
The Challenge Ahead
The lingering threat of chemical weapons presents a critical challenge for Syria’s interim government. In a surprise visit to The Hague in March, Syria’s foreign minister, Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, pledged to the OPCW that the new leadership would destroy any remaining stockpiles left by the Assad regime and ensure compliance with international law. Mr. Shaibani also emphasized the need for international support to achieve that goal.
The OPCW, meanwhile, is advocating for unrestricted access to inspect chemical weapons sites, which the current government has approved.
Ms. Stricker notes that the “interim authorities have taken the right initial steps to assure the international community of its intention to eliminate the Assad regime’s chemical weapons program,” but the matter must remain at the forefront.
“All eyes need to be on their follow-through. Countries should provide financial, personnel, intelligence, or otherwise assistance that the OPCW requires to complete its mission successfully,” she said.
“This will be a huge task. The OPCW needs to investigate previous declarations by the Assad regime, identify gaps, access key facilities, and interview personnel who may have fled or be in hiding, among other activities, all while in an uncertain security situation where key documents have gone missing.”
Director of the Chemical Violations Documentation Center of Syria, which is associated with the OPCW, Nidal Shikhani, tells the Sun that, as it stands, the current Syrian government does not “have the tools and logistics to support the mission.”
“This work will take years — decades even. If we find a ton of sarin tomorrow, what’s the plan for neutralizing it? Who will take responsibility for that? And finally, how can we ever confirm everything is truly destroyed? That’s the hardest part,” he said. “It’s complicated. It’ll take many years. Syria needs external help.”
However, if there is one notion of accountability in the aftermath of a long-running war with little justice served, Founder and Executive Director of the Syrian Network for Human Rights, Fadel Abdul Ghany, tells the Sun that “individuals who were involved in the program are now being tracked or investigated by the new authorities.”
“While the Syrian government needs to act faster to decimate the stockpiles, arrests are being made, which sends a signal that accountability is on the table,” Mr. Ghany added. “Especially for the top perpetrators.”
The OPCW and the Department of State did not respond to requests for comment.