New Tune in Russia: ‘When I’m 64 … I May Be Conscripted’
The Russian parliament just hustled through a bill that lifts age restrictions on military service to 65 from 40.

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the Sun has analyzed the manpower and materiel woes of the Russian military through the lens of the casualties it has suffered and the equipment it has lost. It now appears that Vladimir Putin is approaching the bottom of the proverbial personnel barrel.
During a legislative blitz earlier this week, the Russian parliament hustled through a bill that lifts age restrictions on military service to 65 from 40. “We need to strengthen the armed forces and help the Ministry of Defense,” the speaker of the Duma, the parliament’s lower house, Vyacheslav Volodin, said.
It remains to be seen how fleshing out its ranks with middle-aged recruits will help Russia’s army in a conflict where its fittest troops have displayed incompetence, ill-discipline, and a lack of fighting spirit.
Other Oldies
The Russian military’s last-resort policies in manpower recruitment are being complemented by its increasing reliance on inferior weapons systems — most of which were already obsolete at the turn of the past century.
British Defense Intelligence reports that the Russian army is now bringing T-62 tanks out of storage for use on the front line in the Donbas sector. Phased out of active service during the mid-1970s, these refurbished T-62s will be vulnerable to Ukrainian anti-tank missiles that have ravaged Russian armored formations over the past three months.
Profiles in Cowardice
With the prospect of Russian victory seemingly vanishing like morning dew under a summer sun, a conga line of international relations gurus has emerged to suggest that Ukrainian conciliation is key to ending the war.
A former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, advised Ukraine to accept a return to the 2020 status quo antebellum that would entail relinquishing claim to Crimea and parts of the Donbas seized by pro-Russian separatists in 2014.
The University of Chicago’s John Mearsheimer, an international relations “realist,” warned that Russia might resort to nuclear weapons if Mr. Putin doesn’t get at least some of his way with Ukraine.
The NATO nations on Europe’s eastern flank were less than enthusiastic about a strategy that would enable Russia to keep some of its ill-gotten gains. “Only Russia losing this war will restore peace in Europe,” President Alar Klars of Estonia said. The Lett deputy premier, Artis Pabricks, expressed a similar sentiment when he declared, “The end game is very clear. Ukrainians must win and the Russians must lose. Sovereignty must be restored. Then we’ll talk.”
It turns out that preaching appeasement from afar from the rarefied precincts of Hyde Park, Illinois (Mr. Mearsheimer), or Kent, Connecticut (Mr. Kissinger), is easy. The closer one gets in proximity to the borders of Mr. Putin’s Russia, the more one hears echoes of Churchill’s observation that an appeaser is someone who feeds the crocodile in the hope of being eaten last.
Standing Fast on the Severski Donets
The Severski Donets River West of Severodonetsk constitutes a major obstacle that the Russians must cross if their effort to cut Ukrainian supply lines to the Kramatorsk Pocket is to succeed. So, it makes strategic sense that the 90th Guards Tank Division would pull out all the stops to capture a bridgehead across the river that would enable the continuation of its advance through eastern Ukraine.
Russian infantry secured positions on the far bank of the Severski Donets while combat engineers constructed a pontoon bridge that would enable the division’s tanks to cross. Ukrainian forward observers then called for fire from their newly acquired artillery — supplied courtesy of America — to deliver a well-directed barrage that destroyed both the bridge and Russian vehicles waiting their turn to cross.
So the Russians tried again, with the same response from the Ukrainians. This act and counteract cycle of war continued for a total of nine times until the destruction of 80 tanks and the infliction of 400 casualties made Russian commanders call off their attack.
The Financial Times cites the engagement at the Severski Donets as an example of the Ukrainian army’s doctrine of “mission command” that delegates decision-making authority to junior commanders in close contact with the enemy. This seems to be giving Ukrainian soldiers an advantage over Russian troops fighting according to a doctrine that mandates blind obedience to orders from higher command.
This is the sort of thing Napoleon meant when he said: “The moral is to the physical as three is to one.” Of course, all those Javelin anti-tank missiles in Ukraine’s arsenal haven’t hurt, either.