Things in the Middle East, as the New York Times’s Thomas Friedman observed in a column this week, are beginning to loosen up – perhaps even to near a “tipping point,” as Mr. Friedman put it. Genuine presidential elections in the Palestinian Authority, President Mubarak’s surprise promise of them in Egypt, first-time municipal voting in Saudi Arabia, the growing opposition in Lebanon to the Syrian occupation: Such developments point to the enormous effect that the American invasion and reconstruction of Iraq has had on the area. Dictatorial Arab regimes are beginnings to feel the pressure for change.

The positive effects of such pressure were, of course, part of the Bush administration’s calculations in making up its mind to go into Iraq. Today, nearly two years later, those who scoffed at its rhetoric about “democratizing” the Middle East are faced with the prospect of having to eat their words. Not that the genuine democratization of any Arab regimes is about to happen tomorrow, but it’s no longer as unimaginable as it was a few years ago.

For Israel, long the region’s only democracy, this is good news. But it is not an unmitigated good and it is necessary to take into account its negative effects, too.

One already sees these effects in the shift of nuance that has taken place in the Bush administration’s attitude toward the Palestinian Authority and its relations with Israel. Openly on Israel’s side as long as Yasser Arafat was in power, Washington now seems to be inching back toward a kind of careful neutrality. President Bush’s most recent declaration about the need for Palestinian “territorial contiguity,” which seemed aimed at the Sharon government’s plans to annex the less than 10% of Palestinian territory that will wind up on Israel’s side of the West Bank security fence, is an example. Just a few months ago, the president was talking, in a different language, of Israel’s right to retain “large settlement blocs” in any peace agreement.

One can’t blame Mr. Bush for this. For years his administration has been preaching, with Israel’s approval and at its behest, about the need for a more democratic Palestinian Authority. Now that such a change shows signs of taking place, one can’t expect Washington to pretend that nothing has happened. If America intends to bring democracy to the Middle East, it has to reward democratization when it occurs, even if this means a less pro-Israel stance.

For Israel, this means less space in which to maneuver. It will now be important both to take into consideration the American need to recompense the Palestinians and to unambiguously let America know just where Israel’s “red lines” run, beyond which it will have to dig in its heels, even if this incurs Washington’s displeasure.

Moreover, what is happening with the Palestinian Authority can happen elsewhere in the future – with Syria, for instance.

Syria is now, for good reasons, in the Bush administration’s doghouse. Its Baath dictatorship has supported pro-Saddam loyalists and anti-American insurgents in Iraq, housed and aided Palestinian terror organizations, allied itself with Iran and the pro-Iranian Hezbollah, and consistently sabotaged Lebanon’s attempts to reclaim its sovereignty, most recently by the murder of the ex-Lebanese prime minister, Rafik el-Hariri. Indeed, never in its territorial and diplomatic dispute with Syria has Israel enjoyed such unconditional American support or experienced so little pressure to give away the Golan Heights as part of a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty.

Yet if Middle East dictators continue to fall, it is only a matter of time before Syrian President el-Assad’s turn comes, too. The fact that the possibility looks remote now does not mean that it cannot happen sooner than most people think. A Syria that is surrounded by a democratic Turkey to the north, a democratic Iraq to the east, a democratic Israel to the south, and a democratic Lebanon to the west cannot remain a dictatorship forever. And if it doesn’t, it too will have to be requited for its democratic reforms.

Israel should not wait for this to happen before deciding how to react. Its strategic planners should be debating now what gestures and concessions can be made to a democratizing Syria in order to encourage it and what are inconsistent with Israel’s national interest, and they should be letting America know in advance what can and can’t expected of Israel in such an eventuality.

This is particularly true of the Golan Heights, from which Israel has in the past left the impression that it would be willing to withdraw in return for a comprehensive peace settlement. This does not appear to be the position of the Sharon government – but unless it makes that position clear now, it may be faced one day with a post-Assad Syria to which it will be asked to make unacceptable concessions, just as it may be asked to make them to a post-Arafat Palestinian Authority.

Israel’s attitude toward Arab democratization has always been ambivalent. While its call for greater democracy in the Middle East has been more than just lip service, it has been tinged by the fear of losing its exclusive position as the sole Middle-Eastern democracy and its right to demand special treatment because of this. A more democratic Middle East will be a more benign one for Israel, but it will also be a more competitive one in which other countries will be able to put forth the same claims. It’s time to start preparing for that now.

Mr. Halkin is a contributing editor of The New York Sun.