Rosenberg Logic and Iran

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The New York Sun

Are France, Germany, and the United Kingdom willing to allow Iran to build a nuclear weapon? This is a fair question considering that these three countries, which have tried for more than a year to cajole the Islamic republic into assuring the world it is not building an atomic bomb, are now unwilling to attach any consequences to their latest deadline of November for the Iranians to come clean.


Last week at Vienna the Europeans tried to make the case that Iran be given until the end of October to, as British Foreign Minister Jack Straw said, “clarify remaining issues” regarding Tehran’s nuclear enrichment program. This position was defensible a year ago, when the International Atomic Energy Agency was just finishing up inspections of the facilities the Iranians had kept hidden from the international community for at least 15 years. A year later it’s insanity.


The latest report from the IAEA, which has been misreported as containing no smoking gun, provides much proof that Iran has negotiated in bad faith. For example, the Iranians have yet to supply the IAEA with information on where it actually got certain equipment, such as magnets for its P-2 centrifuges. Iran has yet to explain adequately why the centrifuge equipment it made domestically has levels of uranium contamination that it had said was because of contamination from imported equipment.


Nor have the Iranians provided a catalog of equipment used at Lavisan-Shian, a facility Tehran said was a physics research site conducting experiments on how to defend against a nuclear attack. The IAEA will never visit this facility because it was recently razed following a dispute between local authorities and the Ministry of Defense.


Despite such unanswered questions, the IAEA has yet to make any judgments with regard to Iran’s nuclear activities. The IAEA’s director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, remains agnostic. “Have we seen any proof of a weapons program? Have we seen undeclared enrichment?” he asked Tuesday. “Obviously until today there is none of that,” added he: “But are we in a position to say that everything is peaceful? Obviously we are not at this stage.”


It’s worth asking Mr. ElBaradei and the Europeans pushing for more negotiations exactly what more proof they need. The reason the IAEA is even considering this issue, after all, is that the mullahs for years failed to tell the atomic watchdog that it built an enormous underground centrifuge at Natanz, that it was conducting laser enrichment experiments at numerous other facilities, and that it had imported yellow cake uranium from China.


Why would one of the world’s leading exporters of petroleum take such pains to hide a peaceful nuclear energy program from the rest of the world? Why is the IAEA bending over backward to ignore nearly two years of delays, false reports, and obstruction to see what’s in front of its nose?


One reason is that under the consensus interpretation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty a nation can develop the infrastructure to enrich uranium and remain in good standing with the international community right up until the moment it decides to turn that infrastructure toward building bombs. North Korea proved that in 2002 when it admitted to having an undeclared enrichment program for the purpose of building a nuclear weapon. Iran seems intent to go down that path as well.


But another reason is that Mr. ElBaradei and the Europeans seem intent on treating all nuclear proliferation the same. Witness the handwringing the IAEA has devoted this week to South Korea’s voluntary admission of some minor enrichment tests. Indeed, some commentators have reasoned that if Israel, which is not a member of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, is allowed to build bombs in Dimona, why can’t Iran build bombs in Natanz?


This is the logic of the Rosenbergs, who rationalized their espionage over 50 years ago by convincing themselves that slipping atomic secrets to the Soviets would create a balance of terror between the two superpowers that emerged after World War II.


Beside all that, there is an important difference. Israel and South Korea are not the world’s leading sponsor of Islamic terror. Israel and South Korea do not torture their journalists, harbor members of Al Qaeda, or provide funding and arms to groups that praise and recruit suicide bombers. A nuclear weapon in the hands of the Iranian mullahs would provide a deterrent to any plans to end its chauvinistic theocracy.


Instead of defying reality and pretending that Iran is not building a nuclear bomb, the world would be better served were the British, French, and Germans to devote their energies aiding the most potent opponents of Tehran’s clerics – the Iranian people.


The New York Sun

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