Their Deepest Difference
This article is from the archive of The New York Sun before the launch of its new website in 2022. The Sun has neither altered nor updated such articles but will seek to correct any errors, mis-categorizations or other problems introduced during transfer.
As the Annapolis conference takes place today, there are Israelis who hope that it won’t be only a press performance and Israelis who hope that that’s all it will be. These two groups can be identified, of course, with the political Left and the political Right, and it’s time it was understood just what, in terms of the “peace process,” the deepest difference between them is.
It’s not the territories. Neither the “undivided land of Israel” diehards of the Right nor the “1967 borders are sacred” fanatics on the Left today represent a very large part of the Israeli public.
A majority of Israelis, Right or Left, simply want the best territorial deal for Israel that can be gotten in military and demographic terms. They’re not overly concerned with what the Bible promised to the Jews or with the morality of annexing land that the Palestinians think belongs to them. The ideology of it doesn’t interest them.
It’s not the lures or dangers of good relations with the Arab world, either. Israelis are no longer where they once were when many on the Left dreamed of integration into the Middle East, of touring Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus, and of joint Israeli-Arab economic and cultural projects, while many on the Right feared the tiny drop of Israel losing its identity in the bucket of the Arab world.
Thirty years of peace with Egypt, and nearly 15 years of peace with Jordan, have demonstrated that neither prediction has anything to do with reality. Arab countries, even when at peace with Israel, have exhibited little interest in joint anythings with it, and Israelis have seen that the charms of Cairo or of Petra soon wear off. Whatever their politics, Israelis are not about to be swallowed by the maw of Arab civilization. Israel is and will remain a Western country.
The real difference has to do with Arab intentions. When the “moderates” in the Arab world declare that, if Israel will make the concessions they demand of it, they will accept its existence and give up the Arab aspiration of destroying it, the Israeli Left believes them. The Israeli Right does not. This is largely what it boils down to in the end.
The Left thinks that the Arabs are sincere in their desire for peace because they have learned and internalized the lessons of war. Israel, they have come to understand, cannot be defeated on the battlefield and in any event possesses nuclear weapons that would be used if it faced military destruction.
Nor would the world, America especially, allow its destruction to take place. It can be diplomatically isolated and pressured into softening its positions, but it cannot be annihilated and therefore must be come to terms with.
The Right takes this to be wishful thinking. The Arabs have indeed, it says, learned a lesson — but it is not what the Left thinks it is. It is rather that unremitting pressure can turn the world against Israel and force it to make concession after concession, each weakening it a bit more. If making peace with it is what is needed to extract more concessions, then let peace be made. There is no peace agreement, after all, that cannot be broken.
Israel can be destroyed once it is weak enough, whether by military action or by an Arab demographic fifth column. Meanwhile, while waiting for the right moment, the Arab world should bide its time and strengthen itself militarily and economically.
The Left believes in Israeli concessions because it believes in Arab concessions: The two, it holds, are symmetrical and must come together. The Right denies that such a symmetry exists. “Peace for land,” it holds, is a fundamentally asymmetrical proposition, because land is a concrete asset that cannot be easily regained once surrendered while peace is a variable notion that can be whittled away at a country’s will. Never, says the Right, trade real estate for junk bonds.
Who is right? Israelis in the political Center listen to both arguments and can’t make up their minds. The past is an uncertain guide. Look at Egypt, says the Left: Nearly 30 years ago it signed a peace treaty with Israel and for 30 years it has scrupulously observed this treaty’s provisions; isn’t this proof that the Arabs can be trusted?
Yes, look at Egypt, retorts the Right. For 30 years it has made sure that this peace stays a cold one, has encouraged vehemently anti-Israel feelings in its populace, and has systematically expanded and modernized its armed forces far beyond their need to fight anyone except Israel. Surely this demonstrates that its ultimate intentions toward Israel are hostile.
And the future? One can put many things on the Israel-Arab negotiating table: Diplomatic relations, borders, security arrangements, demilitarized zones, refugees, regional cooperation, and so on and so forth. Alas, one thing that cannot be put on it is Arab and Palestinian intentions. It is possible to make educated guesses about the long-term thinking of someone you are negotiating with, but there is no way of turning it into an enforceable clause in a written agreement.
And perhaps the Arabs and the Palestinians do not really know themselves. That they would be happy should Israel one day disappear is incontestable. How many risks they would be willing to run to help make this happen is something else again.
Israel’s Left says they are ultimately too rational to think such a goal is achievable. Israel’s Right says that when your own existence is at stake, you do not count on the rationality of others. Israel’s Center stands and scratches its head.
Mr. Halkin is a contributing editor of The New York Sun.