There is something almost farcical in the contortions that the world is going through regarding its relations with the new Hamas-Fatah Palestinian “unity government.” Which of the ministers in the new government will be talked to and which won’t? Which of its policies will be recognized as representing it and which will not be? Through whom in it will funding be channeled, and on what condition, and to whom will funding be denied?

In short, the new Palestinian government is to be treated as if it were really two governments, one a “good,” pro-peace-with-Israel government that can be dealt with and one a “bad,” anti-peace one that will continue to be boycotted. It’s as if someone with trouble focusing went to the eye doctor and was told that the solution lay in a special pair of glasses that produced double vision.

Needless to say, this is totally absurd. The “Palestinian unity” government may not last long, and sooner or later Fatah and Hamas may be at each other’s throats again, but meanwhile they have formed one government, not two.

The elected prime minister of this government, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, continues to refuse to recognize Israel, has ruled out a permanent peace with it, and has expressed his hope and expectation that it will disappear one day. By joining forces with him on this basis, which it had pledged never to do, it is Fatah and its leader Mahmoud Abbas who have given in to Hamas, not vice versa.

Yet this does not necessarily mean that it is in Israel’s interest for America and the European Union to ostracize the new government, or that Israel should urge them to do so. On the contrary: As long as the world knows exactly what can and cannot be expected from a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, and what should and should not be demanded of it, there is something to be said for recognizing it.

Given the attitudes of Hamas, one thing that cannot be expected of the new Palestinian government is to be able to enter into meaningful peace negotiations with Israel. Therefore, any American or European assistance to this government should be coupled with the understanding that there must be no pressure of any kind on Israel to make territorial or other concessions to it.

To ask Israel to negotiate with Mr. Abbas while the latter is being embraced by Mr. Haniyeh makes as much sense as asking someone to pet a dog while a cobra is twined around it. Although the dog may wag its tail at you, it is not exactly a free agent.

But Fatah and Mr. Abbas would also not be free agents if the “national unity” government fell apart, or even if — an increasingly unlikely prospect — they eventually could replace it with a regime of their own. Then, too, they would lack the political strength and will vis-à-vis a radicalized Palestinian public to make the minimal concessions to Israel — abandoning the Palestinian “right of return,” for example — that serious peace negotiations would entail.

And precisely because of this, there is no logic at all to the American-Israeli scenario, accepted until now by the European Union as well, that envisioned toppling a Hamas-led government as a way of restarting the Israel — Palestinian Arab peace process. For the foreseeable future this process is dead, and no amount of wishful thinking can revive it.

Moreover, since Fatah cannot, and Hamas does not want to, arrive at a peace settlement with Israel, there is a distinct advantage for Israel in having the two share power. This is because, although neither of these two organizations can by itself put an end to Palestinian terror against Israel, each having no control over extremist elements in the other, they can manage to do it together if they so wish.

Over the past year, indeed, both have done it to a considerable extent, most of the attacks on Israeli civilians in this period having come from the radically fundamentalist Islamic Jihad — and Fatah and Hamas are quite capable between them of reining in Islamic Jihad, too, if they make an effort.

This, then, is what the international community should demand from the Palestinian “national unity” government in return for recognizing and working with it: a complete cessation of anti-Israel terror, any resumption of which will automatically cut off all international collaboration and aid.

Unlike the demand to conduct serious peace negotiations, this is something that such a government is capable of complying with and can be held to account for if it fails to do so.

Such an arrangement, if accompanied by a serious commitment on the part of Egypt to prevent heavy arms from being smuggled across its border into the Gaza Strip, would have advantages for everyone. The new Palestinian government would be allowed to govern.

Israel would have, not a negotiated peace with the Palestinians, which is at the moment unattainable, but a possibly long interval of peace-and-quiet that would not involve any significant sacrifices on its part. And the Palestinians themselves would have, if their new government can function, a measure of law and order and enough international financial aid to keep their economy going and hunger from the door.

Even if such an arrangement would be attainable, of course, how long it might last would be anyone’s guess. The new Palestinian government could fall apart in a matter of months. But if it doesn’t, or if Hamas remains in power in any case, the latter has often spoken of a hudna, or Islamic truce, with Israel that would involve a long-term cessation of hostilities without peace or recognition.

Theoretically, such a truce could last for years. Under the circumstances, it might be the best deal for everyone that could be reached.

Mr. Halkin is a contributing editor of The New York Sun.