One might imagine that questioning the sovereignty of more than a handful of European states by the envoy of another would draw ire from Europe’s leaders. One might even imagine that it would prompt European officials to reconsider the nature of their diplomatic relations with the offending party.

Feature, though, Europe’s reaction to remarks of Communist China’s attaché in France, Lu Shaye, in an interview last week with French television. Asked whether Crimea was part of Ukraine under international law, Mr. Lu asserted that all post-Soviet states lack such a firm basis for their sovereignty.

After an initial bout of European outrage — swiftly met with a feigned retraction by Beijing — the episode appears to have done little to rattle China’s “endless” ties with Europe. Instead, it seems to have inserted the People’s Republic of China more squarely into European affairs.

For while some European officials condemned the remarks, and others summoned Chinese representatives for clarification, the consensus appears to have coalesced around the notion that it is the Chicom regime that is best suited to mediate an ostensible peace in Europe, and that relations should be strategically strengthened.  

Just days after Mr. Lu brushed aside the sovereignty of some 15 European nations, President Zelensky held a “long and meaningful” phone exchange with the Chinese party boss, Xi Jingping. The same day, Mr. Zelensky appointed his minister of strategic industries, Pavlo Riabikin, as ambassador to China, a post that had been vacant for two years.

It’s one that Mr. Zelensky hopes might “give a powerful impetus” to Sino-Ukrainian ties. China will now send its special envoy for Eurasian affairs to Ukraine for “in-depth communication” on “the political settlement of the crisis.” China’s new world order might then yet arrive in Europe sooner than expected.

It would be easy to peg Mr. Zelensky’s appeal to Mr. Xi solely on his desire to end conflict in his country. It is, no doubt, the driving factor. Yet even before the war began, Mr. Zelensky had begun to signal his frustrations with the West.

He had also begun to point to a desire to hedge against the American-European-Russian triangle that governs his country’s geopolitics. “I cannot agree with that because in Ukraine we do not feel this,” the Ukrainian leader said when asked about the emerging idea that China is the foremost geopolitical threat.

Later that year, Kyiv retracted its signature from a United Nations statement condemning China’s human rights violations in Xinjiang. Since Mr. Zelensky took office in 2019, bilateral trade between Beijing and Kyiv through 2021 saw double-digit growth, with China as Ukraine’s largest trading partner.

Months before Russian troops invaded his country, Mr. Zelensky also suggested to Mr. Xi that Ukraine could become a “bridge to Europe” for Chinese businesses. Mr. Zelensky’s  appointment of a minister for strategic industries as ambassador to China signals that he might still think so.

Like Beijing, the Ukrainian leader also appears to see a “constructive role” for China in the rebuilding of Ukraine. By inviting Beijing to mediate peace in Ukraine, he appears to be trying to carve out a place for Kyiv between the powers now competing in his country, and to position Ukraine to reap the ostensible benefits.

Yet peace for Communist China does not mean what some in Europe seem to think it does. As this column has previously noted, it is a rhetorical tool leveraged in pursuit of China’s foreign policy goal — to position itself as not only a participant in, but the lead architect of, the postwar order.

From this, much could likely follow. As America and Europe together fashioned the institutions that have governed the post-World War II global order, Beijing, too, would likely claim similar affordances. That is, indeed, its stated aim as it pursues its vision of a new world order with itself at the center.

Should China then be permitted to succeed, European overtures to Beijing in the manner of France’s Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s Olaf Scholz could be vindicated. For it is advisable to be chummy with one’s superior. Indeed, Chancellor Scholz has already invited Premier Li Qiang to parley at Berlin in June.

Mr. Scholz has also recently become increasingly vocal in his support for the revival of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, which has been stalled since 2021. The deal would expand opportunities for EU investments in China –– with Beijing also increasing its footprint in Europe.

The past days have seen a flurry of European activity towards China. President Macron tasked his foreign minister to cooperate with Beijing on a framework governing eventual negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. EU and Chinese officials met over trade relations.

Europe’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, called on EU members to deploy warships to the Taiwan Strait — while also stressing the need for improved relations with Beijing. He has also suggested that Mr. Lu’s televised remarks were a blunder, not representative of China’s official position. 

Yet what if they were a test of Europe’s red line? What if, having now discovered it, Beijing has decided to advance its aims? Mr. Xi had long made known that he would speak with President Zelensky when “the time is right.” That seems to be  now, and questions of sovereignty, indeed, might be on the line.