New York City, in Steven Malanga’s new collection of essays, presents a conundrum. How can a city run by such an inept, ideological political class remain prosperous and livable? Mr. Malanga concludes that, without serious reform, in the long run the city cannot. This verdict on the seeming endless supply of poor elected officials who populate city government leads to a larger analysis of the intellectual antecedent to New York’s problems. Mr. Malanga, a distinguished author and a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, calls it “The New New Left” (Ivan R. Dee, 165 pages, $22.50).

The original New Left was a movement of the 1960s and 1970s characterized by a strident anti-Americanism and an infatuation with various socialist or anti-capitalist ideologies supposed to be superior to the free market economics practiced in the West. After a series of fruitless “movements,” demonstrations, protests, and temptations toward violence, the New Left faded swiftly from historical memory. It left almost no positive legacy, with the possible and unintended exception that from it emerged neoconservatism and a newly energized conservative movement.

The New New Left that Mr. Malanga describes is the heir to its predecessor. Still ideological, its proponents have softened their beliefs in class warfare and anti-Americanism and have become more comfortable influencing or wielding the levers of political power. Instead of calling for an overthrow of capitalism, this newer left has adopted the language of social justice. Its members are strong supporters of increased taxes, expansive social services, and various forms of political correctness.

Since the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the takeover of Congress by the Republicans in 1994,this newer left has concentrated on furthering its policies at the local level. The welfare and policing reforms of the 1990s to some extent turned the tide of policy and public opinion against the New New Left’s core beliefs: that government support is a basic right and that anti-social behavior is caused more by environmental factors than personal responsibility. The result, Mr. Malanga writes, has been “an increasingly cynical coalition, ever more focused on goals that benefit its members and their allies.”

Mr. Malanga calls this coalition the “tax eating” class. It is composed of an alliance of government workers, left leaning politicians, and employees of private social-service agencies. Now concentrated mostly in the nation’s liberal urban centers, the New New Left mainly aims to extract more social services and funding for its members. In doing so, Mr. Malanga argues, it hurts the communities on whose tax revenues it lives.

Perhaps nowhere has this newer left been as successful as in New York City. The city has a long liberal, even leftist, history, and large populations of government workers, liberal foundations, and activists. While the rest of the nation is slowly turning red, New York remains true blue. (It is no wonder the Clintons moved here.). Mr. Malanga examines the intersection of the tax-eating class with local politicians.

Local elected officials have deep roots in the activist, union, or social service communities, rather than in the business class. Such politicians have a ready-made bloc of volunteers and voters. Once in office, they are able to repay the support they received in the form of increased benefits for government workers. “These community activists and government careerists,” Mr. Malanga concludes, “dominate the politics of New York City in a way that borough bosses and political clubs of Tammany once did … [i]rrespective of the public interest, their interest is always more: more city workers with more pay, more social services, more pensions, more benefits – and more taxes.”

This stranglehold on politics is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Business interests will not support an alternative candidate because they believe there is little chance to prevail. So the result may be a bleaker future for New York, as jobs escape the city and enormous central planning projects like the West Side stadium consume valuable urban and tax resources. Mayor Bloomberg is the obvious exception, but he proves the rule and in any event is worlds away from his Republican predecessor, Rudolph Giuliani, in terms of issues like policing.

The capture of government by those with the most to gain from its spoils might not be so troubling if the resulting policies benefited the entire city. But, as Mr. Malanga notes, the increased demands from this coalition are not balanced by obvious benefits: Higher taxpayers’ bills have not translated into a cleaner, safer city. Moreover, those who have taken control seem intent on reversing Giuliani-era reforms that made the city attractive to business and productive citizens.

Mr. Malanga is very good on New York. In the balance of the book, he takes his theme of tax eater versus taxpayer on the road. He criticizes the work of left-wing social critic Barbara Ehrenreich, for example, whose widely praised book, “Nickel and Dimed,” is in some respects a mirror image of his own. Ms. Ehrenreich wants to show that lower-income workers cannot get a fair shake in today’s economy; as Mr. Malanga shows, however, Ms. Ehrenreich’s reporting is skewed by her disdain for her lower-income subjects and contradicted by academic studies that show hard work does lead to greater upward mobility.

Mr. Malanga also attacks the so-called “creative class” thesis of urban development. As he astutely notes, this thesis – which favors large public works, social services, and other New New Left goodies to the exclusion of a pro-business and lower tax environment – is just liberalism warmed over. It provided a way for liberal urban planners “to talk economic-development talk while walking the familiar big-spending walk.” Yet cities such as Pittsburgh and Providence, which have embraced the thesis, found that “creative amenities” don’t attract jobs, and the high-tax environment only serves to drive away business.

Despite scoring some hits, however, Mr. Malanga leaves his larger theme somewhat incomplete. If the New New Left can be found in the major urban centers of the blue states, what can be called the New New Right has exploded in the new exurbs of the red states. This New New Right is defined by its adherence to extreme decentralization, little or no social-service network, and an economic and political structure of extreme individualism. It is unclear whether these new communities will remain prosperous and whether they can build a truly civic social culture.

While it is easy to lampoon some of the ideologies and upper-class socialists that Mr. Malanga profiles, reflexive reliance on the free market does not answer all social ills. The core insight that the common good has a public dimension which cannot be captured by free market transactions alone has helped make New York City a vibrant and sustainable city. The New New Left, consumed by victimology and an anti-business bias, does not have the answers. It remains to be seen who does.

Mr. Russello last wrote in these pages on Enron.