As we go to vote, it is disheartening to reflect that the technology supporting Election Day 2004 is vintage 19th century. American elections are based on an old-fashioned idea: all individuals are perfectly honest. But some aren’t.

Stories that the 9/11 terrorists registered to vote are dismissed, not as untrue, but as the exception rather than the rule.

Osama bin Laden may try to influence our election with video tapes and threats. But surely he has not had his terrorists register millions of times to vote in American elections.

Of course the vast majority of registered voters are legitimate, but our understanding that voter rolls are subject to even limited infiltration and fraud diminishes our confidence in the election process.

We must, and can, do better. Private companies often require far more identification and verification of residence than do local voter registration offices. They do this through ordinary software, computers, and telecommunications systems, ensuring that only those who meet certain standards are issued cards with privileges and responsibilities. Otherwise, they would be out of business.

Individuals and businesses would be reluctant to honor a check drawn on a bank if it were suspected that a large number of accounts were fraudulent – and that the bank had no means to distinguish legitimate accounts from others.

A bank that issues an ATM card knows exactly when and where it has been used, and notifies a user if a transaction is invalid. Banks stop transactions on lost and stolen cards and issue new ones. An unidentifiable individual cannot simply walk up to an ATM and withdraw money.

The process of voting in the United States requires less identification than practically any other legal activity. Americans need to show minimal if any identification, much less proof of citizenship. It is an honor system that works well if everyone is honorable.

Our status as a nation of immigrants and our proper belief in civil liberties make determining voter eligibility more complex than in other countries. But we are not even trying to solve the problem.

Those who move, or college students with homes elsewhere, may quite innocently be on two voter rolls, but not so innocently vote twice. A party precinct captain, seeing that a loyal voter has not shown up at the polls near the end of the day, may be tempted to have a surrogate vote in his stead.

With our voting system (as with almost all others), we cannot verify that our votes have been properly recorded. Is a vote intended for John Kerry recorded as being for Ralph Nader? Are all of our votes on dozens of local elections and referenda recorded accurately? Most of us rely on faith. With an ATM card, we can check our own activity at any time, even before fully registering the transaction. If we like, we can receive a paper receipt for each transaction.

Our state governments have access to the same technology as private companies. But companies have a profit incentive to avoid fraud that seems lacking in our election system.

Tonight, we will wait for hours to hear the results of the election. Revisions subject to recounts or lost ballot boxes may trickle in through the coming days. It is a quaint throwback to a different time. In 1904, such delays and inaccuracies in counting were the best that technology had to offer.

American businesses know all of their transactions as they happen with fewer errors. They are not necessarily on the cutting edge of technology. They simply are a century ahead of the antiquated system we know as American elections.

No one knows exactly how extensive are voter fraud and counting irregularities. These problems might not matter if elections had clear winners and losers. But many elections, including presidential elections, are close contests.

Some suggest that for voting integrity we need more poll watchers, more stringent campaign and election laws leading up to an election, or more litigation in the aftermath of an election. We might do well simply to learn the lessons of American business. What we really need is a simple dose of 2004 technology to cure much of what ails our election system.

Mr. Furchtgott-Roth, a former commissioner of the Federal Communications Commission, can be reached at hfr@furchtgott-roth.com.