The War Deficit
This article is from the archive of The New York Sun before the launch of its new website in 2022. The Sun has neither altered nor updated such articles but will seek to correct any errors, mis-categorizations or other problems introduced during transfer.

As the professional doubters and worriers sharpen their pencils to savage an attack on Iraq, one argument being brought forward is that America cannot afford the war. The New York Times, for one, points out that the last war against Saddam Hussein cost approximately $61.1 billion in 1990 and 1991 — and then our mercenary allies, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, shouldered approximately 80% of the burden. Using the last war as a rough guide for the next war (though that’s never something military types encourage), one can speculate that a new attack could cost more than $80 billion in 2002 dollars. And this time there may be no one in the Middle East willing to split the bill. Given the way things have been going politically, one can imagine that this would come on top of current spending. It’s hard to imagine the Congress cutting domestic programs to fund a war against Saddam Hussein again more than it was willing to cut butter for guns during Vietnam.
So how to put into perspective the question of whether America can afford to run a bigger deficit than it is currently running for the purpose of prosecuting a war? Assuming that every penny spent in Iraq will likely be added to the nation’s existing tab and that a war in Iraq costs the $80 billion it did last time (in inflation-adjusted dollars), one gets a number roughly equal to the shortfall predicted for the 2003 fiscal year. If that year’s deficit were doubled, it would only amount to 1.4% of America’s gross domestic product. If the war cost twice that much, that year’s deficit would be tripled, amounting to 2.1% of GDP. These numbers are both significantly lower than the 3.9% and 4.5% of GDP that the government fell short during the first Gulf War. The deficits would also be roughly in line with those run by the federal government during the height of the Vietnam conflict and during the Korean War.
Call war deficits a measure of national commitment. All the war deficits in the last half century have been dwarfed by those of World War II. But by the indices at hand, America has a long way to go before it gets to the kind of impact on our economy that obtained during Korea and Vietnam and the Gulf. And in weighing action against inaction in Iraq, one has to remember inaction has its costs as well. The economic damage to New York City alone from the September 11 attacks has been estimated in the billions, with insurance claims totaling close to $60 billion. Job and other economic losses are more difficult to measure. That attack was the cost of inaction in the past. Future attacks, including the possibility of future attacks with nuclear weapons, will be the true cost of failing to act against Saddam’s regime. It’s not a big point. But it’s not a small point either. Stacked up against the war deficits in our recent history, the coming conflict looks to be cheap at the price.