Iraqis Prepare To Take Over Security Duties From Americans
This article is from the archive of The New York Sun before the launch of its new website in 2022. The Sun has neither altered nor updated such articles but will seek to correct any errors, mis-categorizations or other problems introduced during transfer.

WEST OF RAMADI, Iraq — On a sandy promontory overlooking the desert that stretches to Syria and Jordan in western Iraq, U.S. Army officers and Iraqi police officials were discussing the future.
The Americans’ concept of the future involved the Iraqis taking responsibility for catching insurgent smugglers and bomb-makers along the two freeways that stretch from the border region to Baghdad.
The future starts now, Captain Ian Lauer explained to Colonel Jassim Mohammad Ali of the Iraqi police, who served in the Iraqi army’s special forces under Saddam Hussein.
“We’ve got to force them to have confidence,” Captain Lauer said. “They ‘ll spend years saying they’re not ready.”
Colonel Ali, a broad-chested veteran of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, insisted that he was ready for the challenge.
“If we see bad people, we will arrest them,” he said through an interpreter. “If they fight us, we will show no mercy. If they use one bullet, we will use two. If they use 10, we will use 100.”
As part of the American plan to withdraw from Anbar province and turn security duties over to the Iraqi army and police force, the Army’s Task Force 1–77 Armor is ceding the desolate area 25 miles west of Ramadi to Colonel Ali’s “emergency response unit,” the Iraqi version of a SWAT team.
The unit’s troops carry Soviet weapons that were once used by Saddam’s army. They drive Ford trucks supplied by America, but they lack body armor and have only rudimentary communications gear.
“Sometimes you feel, ‘We’re forcing them to do stuff,’ and then you think, ‘Hey, it’s your country,’ ” said Captain Lauer, commander of the 1–77’s Charlie Company. “Even if they had the equipment we have, some would complain.”
The process of turning responsibility to the Iraqis is slow and incremental.
For instance, American forces may be turning over freeway security to the Iraqis — a largely symbolic move — but cannot yet turn over the transport of prisoners on those freeways.