According to initial reports, the United Nations envoy Terje Roed-Larsen played hardball this weekend and won. He was able to secure a “commitment” for a complete, though incremental, Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.

Until street demonstrations began in Beirut last month, two models for pressuring Damascus existed. Warren Christopher’s was one. As secretary of state during the first Clinton administration, Mr. Christopher had to wait for hours, on multiple occasions, before the late president, Hafez Assad, was kind enough to let him into his palace office. Very little was achieved, despite frequent declarations of breakthroughs in talks.

Turkey’s approach was more successful. In the late 1990s, Turkish troops gathered at Syria’s border to end the country’s support for the Kurdish group PKK. Once Assad recognized the severity of Ankara’s threat, he expelled the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan and the PKK’s violent insurgency in Turkey was all but over.

On Friday, the Washington Post claimed Mr. Roed-Larsen would deliver an ultimatum to the Syrian president and might threaten international sanctions. U.N. spokespersons were quick to deny such contentions, saying that they run counter to Mr. Roed-Larsen’s style. Knowing the Norwegian diplomat, they are probably right.

As of yet, the current president, Bashar Assad, has not acknowledged publicly his commitment to Security Council resolution 1559, which calls on Syria to withdraw immediately and fully from Lebanon. Instead, he prefers talking about the more self-serving Taif accord, which his father dangled as bait after signing it in 1989. U.N.officials tell me they don’t care what he says for internal consumption, as long as he withdraws his forces prior to Lebanon’s May elections.

They also acknowledge that while resolution 1559 must be obeyed in full, Washington and Paris, which lead the current multinational diplomacy, recommended that Mr. Roed-Larsen press for a Syrian withdrawal commitment now – deferring another part of the resolution, the disarming of Hezbollah, to after the election.

In his previous role as the U.N.’s most senior representative to the Middle East, Mr. Roed-Larsen enthusiastically advocated diplomacy with Yasser Arafat. But as Arafat became a no-name in Washington and his star began to dim in Europe, Mr. Roed-Larsen recognized the futility of his efforts. Instead, he began to push the Syrian track, leaking stories in the Hebrew press, indicating an eagerness on the part of Mr. Assad to negotiate with Israel.

Jerusalem refused to bite. The Sharon government had a lot on its mind as it was creating a new paradigm for the longer-running standoff with the Palestinian Arabs. Israelis never trusted Bashar Assad, still surrounded by his father’s old advisers. Washington was skeptical as well.

While proving that he was the linchpin for any deal with Israel was very important for Mr. Assad, it was not nearly as crucial as holding on to Lebanon. The old guard in Damascus, who recently began talking about the Chinese model of reform, see Lebanon, with its easygoing ways, thriving economy, and international flavor, as their indispensable Hong Kong: not a place to have an embassy, but part of the motherland.

Beirut’s Martyr’s Square could turn into another Tiananmen. If others across the region see some street demonstrators in Beirut as triumphant over Mr. Assad, Arabic for “lion,” the iron-fisted rule that has been the secret of his minority Allawite clan’s decades long survival might lose its grip on power to the Sunni majority, just as Saddam Hussein did in Iraq.

Washington’s Middle East street cred is being tested in Lebanon as well, and much of President Bush’s pro-democracy enterprise depends on the success of the May elections there.

In weekend interviews, the new national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, struck the correct cautious tone towards Mr. Roed-Larsen’s declarations of success from Damascus. “We need to see the details,” he said when asked about Mr. Assad’s announced agreement to comply. Rather than promises, he added, he and his colleagues want to see “deeds.”

As nuanced U.N.-led diplomacy is attempted, remember the other options. In the past, Damascus has proved very skilled at playing the Warren Christopher game, which is why many Lebanese are skeptical of promises being made by Syria now. Diplomacy is a crucial part of the world support the Lebanese prodemocracy demonstrators need to keep their Cedar Revolution alive. It might even prove sufficient to sway the lion cub of Damascus. Eventually, however, the Turkish model might be needed as well.

Mr. Avni covers the United Nations for The New York Sun. He can be reached at bavni@nysun.com.