During the Brexit referendum, an old joke about Germany’s power in the European Union bounced around. The line went that, having twice failed to take Europe by force, with the European Union, Germany had decided to buy it instead.

Though “Remainers” disputed this characterization, modern Europe has been fundamentally shaped by Germany’s policies and errors. Angela Merkel’s catastrophic open-arms approach to mass migration during the Syrian refugee crisis pushed Europe towards the populist right and was crucial to the success of the Brexit campaign.

Shortly after, Germany’s green energy policy started having continent-wide consequences, too, as, having shut down its nuclear reactors and shifted heavily to solar and wind, they found themselves with a national grid overwhelmed in summer and undersupplied in winter. They now import power from other European nations, driving up their energy bills, and Germany’s grid also made them more dependent on Russian oil, whose foreign policy consequences the world is still dealing with.

Germany’s national dysfunction impacts all of Europe, and with this in mind, leaders across the continent are closely watching Sunday’s German elections. This is only the fourth “snap” election in post-war Germany, after Olaf Scholz’s three-party “traffic light” coalition — of SPD, Greens, and FDP — collapsed in December 2024 over budget disputes and an economic policy deadlock.

Even before this, though, the government was unpopular, with voters unhappy with the country’s stagnant economy, immigration policies, and dreadful green energy transition; and it’s these issues that have dominated the electoral campaign.

There are two main parties to pay attention to here. Their turnouts will be the most determinative: the far-right populist party, Alternative for Germany, recently endorsed by Elon Musk, and the center-right front-runner, the Christian Democratic Union, led by Friedrich Merz.

Though the AfD is not leading in the polls, it has dictated the conversation of the election. It goes into Sunday’s election with polling of about 20 percent of the vote, an enormous achievement for a party once considered outside of acceptable German politics. Its leader, Alice Weidel, has pitched herself as an ally to the agenda of “America First” policies, appealing to Mr. Musk and Vice President Vance, and opposing the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty.

Immigration is the top issue in mind, highlighting the 1.1 million asylum applications since 2022 and notable violent and sexual crimes in Germany perpetrated by migrants, along with talking about industrial stagnation and expressing frustration with the war in Ukraine. The AfD stance is that the war in Ukraine is a “U.S. proxy conflict” and that military aid must be ended promptly.

Germany’s approach to the war has been the object of — deserved — universal criticism: they financially supported Putin’s regime through their thirst for Russian oil, then were slow to provide equipment to the Ukrainians, and have spent inefficiently towards helping their supposed ally.

The AfD could shock the polls and come out with the highest vote percentage; but Mr. Merz’s Christian Democratic Union is the solid front-runner, currently polling at 30 percent. If his party were to win the projected 220 seats in the Bundestag, this would be the Christian Democratic Union’s first chancellor since Ms. Merkel’s resignation in 2021. However, though this was once her political home, Mr. Merz has made it clear that this isn’t Ms. Merkel’s party anymore, pushing notably to the right.

Though Mr. Merz rejects formal collaboration with the AfD, he broadly shares its view on immigration, pushing for border controls and new deportation centers. He also agrees that Germany should be less reliant on American defense, pushing to increase military expenditure to 2 percent of GDP.

To this, Mr. Merz attaches a pro-growth, center-right economic policy, prioritizing reduced social spending, more deregulation, tax cuts — particularly for the middle class — and generally more pro-business reforms. Though he has walked back on his support for re-opening Germany’s nuclear power plants — arguing that doing so wouldn’t be practical or economical — he supports loosening Germany’s inflexible green enemy transition policies. In Mr. Merz’s view, Germany’s transition to green energy should be largely market-driven rather than forced by policy, and he supports the development of new nuclear technology, such as small modular reactors.

Germany’s multiparty system means that outright majorities never occur, and winning 30 percent of the vote would likely be enough for Mr. Merz to form a stable coalition government; though even marginal underperformance could cause problems. An American reader might assume that Mr. Merz would partner with the AfD and create a strong majority right-wing government, but doing so would cause massive national and political problems.

In January, Mr. Merz collaborated with the AfD to pass a non-binding anti-immigration motion, breaking a long-held post-war norm against “normalizing” far-right parties, prompting nationwide protests. Though a coalition government might work on paper, doing so would be utterly unstable, with revolts and resignations within his party and a nation beset with protests.

Unsurprisingly, Mr. Merz has repeatedly insisted that he would not form a coalition government with the AfD, but such a refusal may leave him in a precarious position, choosing between an ineffectual minority coalition government or forming an unstable majority coalition with several different parties.

The two most viable partners are not particularly popular. Chancellor Scholz’s SPD is polling at 15 percent — the lowest in modern history — but keeping the party in power would contradict Mr. Merz’s image of pushing Germany in a new, pro-growth direction. The Greens are no better, as their urban progressive support — with 12 percent in the polls — is outweighed by their national unpopularity due to frustrations with energy prices and overregulation.

The pro-business, pro-deregulation Free Democrats party seems like a natural fit, but coalition governments can only be formed with parties earning up to 5 percent of the vote, and the Free Democrats might miss this, as they currently poll at 4.5 percent. Then there are the left-leaning Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance and Die Linke parties, polling at 6 and 8 percent respectively, whose anti-austerity, anti-Ukraine policies don’t match well with Mr. Merz’s center-right Christian Democratic Union remaining the front-runner.

The coalition forming here is difficult to do. To form a government, he may need to sacrifice some of his more right-leaning positions, particularly on spending and migration. These are issues where a majority of Germans lean conservative, instantly making the government less popular; and backing down on them for the sake of party politics would instantly provide rhetorical ammunition for the AfD, whose new-found political success will give them the power to effectively block legislation.

Regardless of the exact outcome, the election marks a notable rejection of the centrist political establishment and a shift to the right for Germany, with a focus on freer markets and tighter borders.