In the movie “The Recruit,” characters exploring the CIA’s training methodology emphasize that nothing is what it seems. To overcome this challenge, trainers teach recruits to focus on one thing only: the bottom line.

When it comes to Iran, the West would be wise to heed this edict instead of becoming bewildered by the catch-and-release of 15 British sailors.

So, what does the 13-day hostage crisis tell us?

The liberal establishment in Europe and America is giving us the same tired analysis, with the pundits urging the West to have “dialogue” with moderates to “deepen” the presumed “divisions” between hard-liners and reformers.

After the sailors were released, dressed in nice little Iranian suits, commentators came to the consensus that talking to the Iranian folks who love the West would be the best way to provoke the second Iranian revolution. But the path to peace in the Middle East can be as slippery as the road to war. The search for moderates in Iran eerily echoes that elusive quest for weapons of mass destruction.

Contrary to the eager-beaver Western analysts who are saying so, there is not enough division between the Iranian population, the mullahs, and President Ahmadinejad to bring on another upheaval. To be sure, moderates, liberals, and reformers exist, but in the next war with the West — when push comes to shove — all of Iran’s 70 million people will fight with the mullahs to protect Islam.

On the other hand, the shootfirst-ask-later crowd in America and Britain, who urged war to liberate the sailors and decried concessions, should first put their money where their mouths are.

America — which has awesome firepower in the Persian Gulf, including two carriers, scores of warships, hundreds of war planes, and warriors directly facing Iran — is the country that actually did much of the conceding to get the Britons released. Europe did not even want to contemplate the increase in sanctions on Iran demanded by the British. Britain’s sailors surrendered so quickly the moment the Revolutionary Guards showed up on their rubber dinghy, one wonders what kind of training they received.

To be fair, all these parties have a right to be confused. Dealing with Iran is like unraveling the intricate knots in a Persian silk carpet. The knots are wound together in such a way that you can flip one over but still wonder which is the front and which the back.

Still, before trying to figure out Iran and what it is up to, the wisest course for the West would be to figure out its own objectives in the Persian Gulf. At last count, after Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the tapestry of the American-European military presence was one of sanctions, naval and air patrols, encirclement, and military bases all stitched together to contain both Iraq and Iran.

That structure has become too tattered to convince anyone, least of all the mullahs. They are not afraid, and we are not frightening. To be sure, Israel is there, in the distance, badly mauled by its failure to lick Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah of Lebanon, last summer.

It would be too easy to blame Western soldiers. They have neither instructions nor a strategy. The Iranians can advance, retreat, be nice, or be rude — whatever they want — because the bottom line is as clear as day: Iran owns the Persian Gulf. Those who want in must make a deal.

As the sole woman in the captured group of British sailors, Faye Turney, told Iranian TV interviewers: “Thank you for letting us go, and we apologize for our actions.” She added one of the words she was taught in captivity: “teshakkor” — Persian for “thank you.” Until the West develops a counterstrategy, the next confrontation will have the same ending.

ymibrahim@gmail.com