Ian Smith, who died Tuesday at 88, was the prime minister of Rhodesia and an ardent advocate of white rule; in 1965 he unilaterally declared independence from Britain, and over the next 15 turbulent years fought an increasingly bitter war against African nationalist guerrillas, a war that cost between 30,000 and 40,000, mainly black, lives — but it was a struggle he eventually lost, paving the way for the country’s independence as Zimbabwe.

To his supporters — white Rhodesians and many in Britain — he was a political visionary, the simple farmer who had stepped forward reluctantly to defend his country against communism. To the left he was as abhorrent as the leaders of apartheid South Africa. To Smith and his supporters it seemed the West was only too willing to overlook military dictatorship, violence, and corruption in black Africa while condemning Rhodesian society which, whatever its shortcomings, offered relative security for its citizens. The West, Smith argued, no longer had the will to stand up to communism; Rhodesia was the front line, and the whites were not engaged merely in a battle for their existence but for civilized values.

Smith managed to convince white Rhodesians that they could continue to defy world opinion indefinitely: “I don’t believe in black majority rule over Rhodesia,” he proclaimed, “not in a thousand years.” The tide of white emigration from Rhodesia was reversed as thousands of whites, mainly from Britain and South Africa, came to enjoy the advantages of white supremacy.

Smith, the first native-born Rhodesian to lead his country, seemed a simple man, blunt, unemotional, and lacking a sense of humor. He was awkward socially, disliked publicity, and his taste in clothes was drab. But his craggy, rough-hewn image concealed an astute tactical mind and a talent for political infighting, which his opponents tended to underestimate. British negotiators found that Smith constantly changed the goal posts of negotiation. He denied being a racist, yet almost in the same breath would insist that separate development and racial discrimination were essential ingredients of Rhodesian society.

But, in the end, it was not diplomacy that wore Smith down, but armed black opposition and, decisively, South Africa’s decision to withdraw support.

From 1972, guerrilla armies led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo were leading regular attacks on white border farms. By 1977 the war was costing Rhodesia around $1 million a day, and all able-bodied men between 18 and 60 were spending up to a third of the year on active service.

Negotiations began that year in London over what would become Zimbabwe. White Rhodesians were left with a deal that removed all traces of their political influence and, after the country’s first democratic elections held in 1980, brought about the one thing Smith had promised them they would never have — a black Marxist government run by the man they most abhorred, Mr. Mugabe.

Ian Douglas Smith was born on April 8, 1919, at Selukwe, Southern Rhodesia (now Shurugwi, Zimbabwe), the son of a Scottish-born butcher and cattle dealer who had emigrated in 1898. Smith interrupted his studies Rhodes University in Grahamstown, South Africa, in 1939 to join Britain’s Royal Air Force. He flew in the North African campaign. His face had to be reconstructed after a horrific accident on takeoff in 1943, which left him with a somewhat menacing stare.

After completing his studies Smith was elected to the Southern Rhodesian Assembly in 1948. By 1958 Smith had become chief government whip, and was instrumental in founding the Rhodesian Front (RF), committed to negotiating independence from Britain with a government based upon the white minority.

After succeeding Field as prime minister in April 1964, Smith moved quickly to show he meant business. His first official act was to authorize the arrest and banishment of four black African nationalist leaders. Even as the world protested and imposed sanctions, Smith rallied white Rhodesian opinion behind him. A series of negotiations with the British ended in failure in 1969, which Smith announcing, “It was clear to us throughout the talks that the British were obsessed with the question of African majority rule. There will be no majority rule in my lifetime — or in my children’s.”

Smith created a new constitution that would “entrench government in the hands of civilized Rhodesians for all time,” which specified that the black population would achieve equal representation with the whites in the distant future. Rhodesia became an independent republic on March 1, 1970. Agitation in the black community increased.

On December 21, 1972, guerrilla forces operating from neighboring Mozambique attacked an isolated white homestead in Centenary district, ushering in a period of escalating guerrilla activity, with frequent murders and terrorist attacks. Smith responded initially by lengthening the period of compulsory military service, and by sanctioning reprisals against any Africans suspected of helping the guerrillas, brushing aside warnings that this would drive villagers into the hands of the extremists. In 1975 Joshua Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe joined together as the Patriotic Front and prosecuted a punishing guerrilla war.

In 1976, the secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, presented Smith with a draft settlement providing for “black majority rule within two years.” Playing for time, Smith agreed to the deal. The white exodus had began.

Agreement with the nationalists could not be reached, and by mid-1977 the war had spread across the whole country. By now Smith believed that his only hope of holding on to power lay in coming to an internal settlement with some of the more moderate black leaders. In November 1977 he announced he was prepared to accept the principle of one-man-one-vote as a basis for discussions.

Although Smith resigned as prime minister, staying on as minister without portfolio under moderate the Methodist Bishop, Abel Muzorewa, there was little doubt where power really lay. Four days after Muzorewa took office, Rhodesian forces raided Mozambique. The raid began at 3 a.m. and Muzorewa was not informed about it until three hours later.

When Margaret Thatcher came to power in May 1979, her inclination was to recognize Muzorewa’s government and lift sanctions. By now the Rhodesian armed forces were seriously short of manpower, and in September Smith was forced to accept Mrs. Thatcher’s invitation to a London peace conference.

Smith denounced the draft settlement as “madness,” but Muzorewa supported the proposals, and on December 11 the Rhodesian Parliament voted to dissolve itself in favor of an interim British administration.

In subsequent elections, Mugabe’s party swept to victory, winning most of the seats in the new parliament. Despite Mugabe’s inflammatory rhetoric, whites at first kept their land and foreign investment was encouraged. Smith continued to excoriate Mugabe as a Marxist dictator, but during the 1980s was seen as an increasingly irrelevant figure.

During the 1990s, as Mugabe’s regime became increasingly corrupt and violent, Smith took a grim delight in seeing his predictions come true: “It helps lift my depression that the majority of black people are saying it is time to get rid of this bunch of corrupt gangsters,” he said.

Smith continued to nurse a deep sense of grievance about the way he had been “betrayed” by those countries, principally Britain and South Africa, which he felt should have been his friends. In his memoirs, The Great Betrayal (1997) he put the blame for Rhodesia’s collapse on almost everybody except himself: “We had the greatest national spirit in the world, a fantastic country, great race relations, the happiest black faces in the world … if our friends hadn’t betrayed us, we’d have won.”