Now that Alan Hevesi has pleaded guilty to the felony of defrauding the government and has resigned from the state office of comptroller in order to avoid a prison term, the time has come to examine the office itself. For if there is one position in New York State government that has the potential for corruption, the comptroller’s office is it.

If asked, “Who is the richest man in the world?” likely responses might be the Sultan of Brunei, Bill Gates, or Warren Buffett, but the correct answer is none of the above. The richest man on the globe is the New York State comptroller, for he has unilateral control of a $145 billion pension fund.

With this kind of influence the comptroller can make friends very easily. He decides who manages the money. Most importantly, he makes these decisions by himself. He has an advisory body, but he ultimately has complete authority to make investment decisions without any oversight or intervention from the state Legislature or the governor.

Let’s say, for the sake of argument, the comptroller decides to give the XYZ Assets Company the right to manage $1 billion and the commission is 10 basis points or $1 million. Suppose, as well, that the comptroller says the expectation is that the fund should perform at least as well as the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index. If the manager is smart or lazy or both, he puts the index on his computer and manages $1 billion in conjunction with it. He can now spend his time playing golf in Bermuda.

This could be the end of the scenario, but it isn’t. When the incumbent comptroller runs for office, he invariably calls on the asset manager to step up to the plate by contributing to his campaign. As you might imagine, the asset manager is pleased to pay. He knows full well that you have to pay to play.

As a consequence, there is a clear correlation between campaign contributions and management commissions. Remarkably, journalists have generally ignored this relationship. Yet if any condition warrants examination in the New York State administration, this is it.

Let me cite several examples randomly selected from New York State reports that illustrate the point. Blaylock & Partners manages $155.7 million of pension fund money and receives a commission of $256,594. In 2003 this asset management group gave $10,000 to the Hevesi for New York campaign committee. Guggenheim Partners manages $1.45 billion and gave Hevesi $25,000 in 2006. Mezzacappa Investors manages about $1.11 billion and gave $48,000 in multiple checks for the 2006 Hevesi campaign and $7,500 in 2004. Williams Capital Group manages about $1.76 billion generating a commission of $631,204 and gave $15,000 to Hevesi for New York in 2003. Guzman & Co., a small investment house, manages $50 million with a $310,032 commission and contributed $5,000 in 2006 and $5,000 in 2004 to Hevesi. Ramirez Partners LLC manages $48 million with a commission of $303,711 and in 2004 gave $5,000 to the Hevesi campaign.

If you parse through the list of contributors — not easy to do since the names of contributors are not obviously associated with an investment house — it is clear that most of Hevesi’s $5 million campaign fund in 2006 came from the asset management community. In fact, only about $340,000 in the campaign kitty came from sources other than the asset management community.

That there is a correlation between commissions and campaign contributions is undeniable. Some of these asset management firms may be doing a perfectly reasonable job, and in fact, there isn’t any reason to assume otherwise.

My point, however, is not to allege wrongdoing. What I’m suggesting is that a system without controls, one that gives the comptroller sole authority for pension investment decisions, is an invitation for malfeasance and corruption. Every comptroller has recognized this issue, but in recent years they have been reluctant to say so since revelations might restrain campaign contributions. What is at stake, however, is far more egregious than the roughly $200,000 of taxpayer money Hevesi used for limousine transportation and household services to assist his wife.

For one thing, the comptroller has a fiduciary responsibility to maintain the integrity of the pension fund. Therefore, the fund should not be used as a way to solicit campaign contributions. New York State clearly needs transparency on this matter. If an investment house gets a management contract and then contributes to a campaign, that action should be revealed to the public.

Second, the Senate and the Assembly should play a role in monitoring investment decisions made by the comptroller’s office. Most states follow the practice of California, where that state’s Legislature monitors the California Pension Fund, the largest pension fund in the country.

The comptroller might enjoy the independence he has, but as far as New York taxpayers are concerned, transparency and oversight make a lot of sense.

Mr. London, president of Hudson Institute and professor emeritus of New York University, is author of “Decade of Denial” and was a candidate for state comptroller in 1994.