After next month’s Palestinian election, attention will turn to Israel’s plan to evacuate Jewish settlements in Gaza. Despite a vote by Israel’s Parliament in favor of the plan – and, to some extent, because of the vote – various members of Prime Minister Sharon’s Likud Party, members of other political parties, and settler groups have argued for a popular referendum on the Gaza pullout.

Some advocates of the referendum idea may be motivated by hopes of delaying the pullout from Gaza or of eventually reversing the decision. But there are some sound policy and theoretical reasons for supporting the referendum idea. And these perspectives should be understood, not only because of the importance of the Gaza pullout itself, but also because of the implications of the parliamentary vote vs. popular vote decision on other fundamental decisions that Israel may soon be called upon to make.

Corporate law provides some analogies. As Melvin Eisenberg, a noted corporate law scholar, said some 35 years ago, the more significant a decision is in the life of the corporation, the less frequently it happens, the less absolute speed is necessary to implement the decision, and the more the decision relates to basic conceptions (in the case of the corporation, “investment” rather than “business” decisions), the more the shareholders expect – and corporate law gives them – the right to vote on the matter. A shareholder vote usually comes in addition to a decision by the corporation’s board of directors, which is generally charged with making business decisions.

Examples of such big decisions in corporate law include mergers, sales of all the assets of a corporation, and dissolution. The idea of the shareholder vote follows from the reason why corporate law provides for a board of directors: great numbers of shareholders cannot meet frequently, speed of making and implementing decisions is usually necessary, and most decisions are not fundamental in light of the corporation. Nor do shareholders, simply because of their shareholding, necessarily have the expertise to make ordinary business decisions. However, although the line between investment and business decisions has been legitimately debated, shareholders are investors, and when a transaction does not occur frequently, speed is not necessary and the decision fundamentally affects the shareholder’s investment, the reasons why shareholders have turned over management to a board of directors are not present. Moreover, the shareholder vote serves as a check on a body that may, if unchecked, favor its own interests over the interests of the shareholders as a whole. Finally, the vote also legitimizes the action taken, and makes the subsequent action pursuant to the vote less susceptible to attack, particularly where a majority of disinterested shareholders vote to approve the transaction at issue.

These considerations that determine, in corporate law, when shareholders must or should vote to approve the actions of a board of directors, can and should inform those political contexts, such as fundamental decisions about the future borders of a country, in which the populace as a whole should approve a parliamentary decision. A fundamental misconception is that “representative democracy” – and Israel’s parliamentary system is a form of such – requires that only the elected representatives make a decision. As in corporate law, where a board makes decisions on behalf of the shareholders of the corporation, there are good reasons why “democracy” in most contexts requires “representative democracy.” Among these are the infeasibility of huge numbers of people assembling to make decisions, and, even if that were occasionally feasible, assembling on a continual basis in a legislative context. When these primary reasons for having representative democracy rather than popular democracy are not present, a popular vote along with a representative vote comes far closer to the ideal of democratic rule than does a representative vote alone.

Moreover, the citizenry should expect direct participation: the decision is fundamental in terms of the size and character of the Jewish state within the larger area of the historical land of Israel. Realistically, the decision to withdraw all settlers from Gaza means that, in any future negotiation over Israel’s and a future Palestinian state’s borders, Gaza is “off the table.” Bargaining will begin with that proposition. Hence, this decision differs from the withdrawal from Sinai, which no one ever claimed as part of the Land of Israel, and from the question of the route of the West Bank security fence, which Israel itself disclaims as establishing a final border. And, as in corporate law, the necessity for a citizenry vote can be a check on the self-interest of the parliamentarians; it’s no hidden secret that votes in the Israeli Knesset, as in other parliamentary systems, often reflect various quid pro quos that track the selfish interest of the Knesset members as much if not more than the policy positions underlying the merits of the decision.

Indeed, a parliamentary system, especially the Knesset, requires a popular check arguably more than does a board of directors in the corporate context. The vote of Israeli citizens for lists of candidates of parties does not suffice before the fact, as, ironically, the government that has advocated and sponsored the Gaza pullout is the very list of Knesset members that vowed to support the settlements. Nor does the possibility of a vote after the fact – voting Knesset members out of office who have voted contrary to the citizenry’s wishes – suffice as a remedy. As in the case of a dissolution or merger of a corporation, the decisions being undertaken – especially the setting of permanent borders – cannot feasibly be reversed.

In all probability a popular referendum will not reverse the Knesset decision, but the very fact of a favorable popular vote will help to legitimize it in a way that popular polls based upon sampling and statistical probabilities cannot. Legitimation serves the important function of fostering the stability of a government and its structure. It also makes less likely popular resistance by dissenters to the parliamentary decision taken. And the precedent of a popular referendum when the most fundamental aspects of Israel’s future are at stake, especially its borders and Jewish character, will be of great importance when future decisions with respect to the Golan Heights and withdrawal from all or parts of the West Bank and Jerusalem are in issue. These decisions should ultimately be made not only by a strong prime minister, or even a cajoled or willing majority of the Knesset, but also by the people themselves. It is their country.

Mr. Phillips is a professor of law at Northeastern University in Boston.