Before even a single vote was cast in Venezuela’s presidential election yesterday, it appeared that the left had already won an incredible victory. On the ballot were two candidates — Hugo Chávez and Manuel Rosales — whose entire campaigns revolved around high-profile populist measures designed to appeal to Venezuela’s poor and disenfranchised. Mr. Chávez promised to expand the literacy programs, subsidized grocery stores, and other social initiatives that he inaugurated in his first term, while Mr. Rosales proposed handing out free debit cards loaded with cash from Venezuela’s soaring oil profits. The last few days of the campaign saw the candidates bickering over who was going to increase government spending more.

No doubt the world’s intellectual left is rushing once again to wave the banner of the Bolivarian Revolution, as Venezuela’s new social conscience has been dubbed after the 19th-century national hero, Simon Bolívar. But underneath all the revolutionary bravado lies an uncomfortable reality. The driving force of Venezuela’s leftward turn is not slogans or ideology or solidarity: It’s cash. Record petroleum prices in recent years have pushed Venezuela, the number five oil-producing country in the world, into double digit economic growth. Billions of dollars come pouring into government coffers every year through oil revenues, and everyone wants a piece.

Under Mr. Chávez, they’ve more or less gotten it. The most publicized recipients have been the poor, for whom $16.6 billion was budgeted this year for social programs. But certain of the rich haven’t done so badly either, which explains a recent surge in the sale of luxury vehicles. Wilmer Ruperti, a Caracas businessman who on Friday was featured on the front page of the Wall Street Journal, is just one example of the wealthy Venezuelans who have quietly sidled up to the Bolivarian Revolution to take their cut. Others with the right connections were thrown a bone earlier this year when Vicente Rangel, the vice president, nixed the seizure of a Caracas country club by that city’s overzealous chavista mayor. Private banks, meanwhile, have benefited from governmental largesse in the form of Argentine bonds sold to them at the official bolívar exchange rate, which they then sold abroad in dollars.

For Venezuela, this kind of oil-boom populism is an old story. During the high times of the 1970s — when Venezuela was the world’s number one importer of Johnny Walker whiskey, and the phrase “dáme dos” or “I’ll take two” was associated with Venezuelans on shopping sprees in Miami — Carlos Andrés Pérez, then Venezuela’s president, undertook an ambitious program of nationalization of the oil industry, coupled with generous social programs.

The difference this time is that Venezuela has also used its new-found oil wealth to create a platform from which to denounce globalization and place itself at the vanguard of a group of leftist leaders who have swept to power in Latin America, most notably in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia. At the beginning of 2006, with key presidential elections coming up in Peru, Mexico, Ecuador, Chile, and Nicaragua, it seemed as if left-wing populism might consume the entire region. That, however, has not become the case. What’s more, even some of the most vocal left-wing leaders in the region have turned down the rhetoric after realizing the importance of political compromise and stability.

The one exception to this counter-trend has been Venezuela, and the reason is clear: High oil prices provide a cushion for radical ideas that would sink any normal economy. The political price of capital flight, free-speech restrictions, currency controls, a shrinking middle class, increasing violent crime, and galloping inflation is offset by the ready cash that high oil prices provide. All of which is why this year’s presidential election consisted mainly of fisticuffs over who will hand out more of Venezuela’s oil cash: It’s not necessarily principled largesse, but voters sure do appreciate it.

Among the scramble, the real loser is the long-term stability of Venezuela. Though the economy has grown tremendously in the last few years, that growth is perched precariously and almost exclusively on high oil prices. Meanwhile, manufacturing businesses not associated with the oil industry have been closing in droves. And informal street vendors now clog the center of Caracas. By spending the oil cash lavishly and investing little, the Venezuelan government has also driven inflation rates to the highest in the region, shrinking the savings of Venezuelans who can’t buy dollars because of currency restrictions.

Whether Mr. Chávez or Mr. Rosales is the next leader, Venezuelans should expect more of the same, and the lesson of the oil boom of the 1970s doesn’t seem to have sunk in very well. Back then, when Mr. Pérez was setting up his social programs and Venezuelans were buying two of everything, no one thought to plan for a future without sky-high oil prices. When the prices finally did come down, Mr. Pérez’s social programs turned out to be unsustainable. The economy stagnated. Then in 1992, during another term as president, Mr. Pérez was the victim of a bloody coup attempt.

It was led by a young soldier named Hugo Chávez Frías.

Mr. Krupa is a freelance writer and researcher who has lived and worked in Costa Rica and has traveled to Venezuela and other Latin American countries.