The decision of the Bush Administration to grant Israel $30 billion in defense-related aid over the next 10 years is a welcome expression of America’s traditional commitment to the security of the Jewish state — but, ironically and less propitiously, it might also serve as a means to overcome opposition in Congress to the $20 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia, which, according to press reports, will include satellite-directed aerial bombs, the upgrading of military aircraft, and modern naval vessels. The official explanation given for this mega-deal is the growing threat to the region from Iran, but few military experts in America believe that in case of an armed conflict with that country Saudi Arabia would or could be an effective and willing player. Be this as it may, the de facto linkage between aid to Israel and arms to Saudi Arabia does not bode well for Israel — not in substance and not from the point of view of American public opinion. Under certain circumstances, it could even make aid to Israel a “hostage” to Congress giving the go-ahead to the Saudi package.

More specifically, the deal will endanger Israel’s vital qualitative edge over any combination of Arab forces. Egypt too will receive additional military aid to the tune of $13 billion over the next 10 years — to include AIM-9X missiles for the Egyptian air-force — which would put the Egyptian air-force on par with Israel’s own capabilities.

Another question raised by the arms deal with Saudi Arabia is, of course, it’s timing. Only a few days before the announcement, the American Ambassador to the United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, had castigated Saudi Arabia for “pursuing destabilizing policies with regard to Iraq.” This isn’t all; Saudi Arabia and some of its citizens are actively promoting and financing much of the world’s terrorist activities, and not only amongst Sunni Iraqis.

Also, Washington probably hasn’t forgotten Saudi King Abdullah’s statement branding America’s presence in Iraq “illegal.” Nor has Riyadh been more accommodating on the Palestinian-Israeli peace front; the “Mecca agreement” between Hamas and Fatah brokered by the Saudi King Abdullah went against the grain of American policy — and now that following the events in Gaza, the agreement has collapsed, Washington suspects that the Saudis are making an effort to revive it.

But even more crucially, the Saudis have given no indication that they would be willing to move toward recognizing the State of Israel and its right to exist.

While official Israeli spokespersons tried to depict a recent visit to the country by the Egyptian and Jordanian Foreign Ministers as a mission on behalf of the “Arab League” as a whole — i.e. including Saudi Arabia — the League’s Secretary General, Amro Mussa, was quick to disabuse them of that notion.

Logically, America would have every right to expect Saudi Arabia, whose security ultimately depends on America, to be more cooperative on Iraq and on other matters in the Middle East — but the perception of a weakened American administration, plus its inherent fundamentalist leanings, apparently instilled in the royal family a belief that their support must be bought at a price.

The recent trip of Secretaries Rice and Gates to Jidda was, of course, principally aimed at ascertaining a more positive Saudi stance with regards to Iraq. Whether that objective will be achieved remains to be seen, but in the meantime, and in order to make the Saudis more amenable, there have been two developments whose timing obviously was no coincidence: the $20 billion arms package — and the decision to hold in the fall some sort of international conference on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict — to be based, whether officially or not, on the “Saudi initiative.”

The Arabs, including Abu Mazen, have made no secret of their intention to use the proposed meeting as a venue to force Israel to accept all of their inflexible demands — or face increasing international pressure. They assume that the Israeli government in its present precarious political situation will be less of a problem, and they also seem to believe, though perhaps erroneously, that the American administration, facing both domestic and external political difficulties, might not be wholly unsympathetic to their designs.

In consequence, and to nobody’s great surprise, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, announced at a press briefing with Ms. Rice that his country “would consider attending the conference.”

But isn’t the famous “Arab Peace Plan” and the so-called “Saudi initiative” on which it was based a step toward peace and full recognition of Israel — some will ask?

The answer is no, at least not in its present form. Deliberately discarding the generally agreed formula for negotiations, namely U.N. Security Council resolution 242 which addressed most of the cogent issues, including Israeli withdrawals from some of the land it had seized in its defensive war of 1967 — but also the matter of security and defensible borders — a subject which also was the principal subject of President Bush’s 2004 letter to former Prime Minister Sharon — the Saudi proposal in effect submitted what amounts to an ultimatum to Israel: Agree in advance to withdraw to the pre-1967 vulnerable “Green Line,” including in Jerusalem and accept the U.N. General Assembly formula for the refugee question which in essence is the “right of return” by another name.

In other words, if Israel were to accept this dictate, it would find itself faced with a “choice” between eventual obliteration from without — or from within.

Ambassador Shoval is in charge of foreign policy for the Israeli Likud Party. A former member of the Knesset, he twice represented Israel in America, between 1990 and 1993, and between 1998 and 2000.