One sure way to test whether a government is serious about enabling free and fair elections is to examine how it treats journalists. Azerbaijan, where elections over the past decade have been anything but free and fair, is no exception.

With less than three months until parliamentary elections in November, Azerbaijan finds itself center stage in the ongoing democracy struggle in the former Soviet Union. Given the political ferment in Georgia, Ukraine, and Central Asia, these upcoming elections have particular significance.

It is therefore an opportune time to ask whether the November ballot will be any different from previous elections in this strategically important, energy-rich country.

Using the press barometer, the prognosis is not good. Most of the key indicators for the institutional health of an independent press are very weak, or absent all together. (Note: Azerbaijan rates “Not Free” in Freedom House’s annual survey of press freedom and is similarly evaluated in other major press-freedom measures.)

Authorities use a variety of tools to manipulate and intimidate the press. State businesses in Azerbaijan, for example, do not advertise in opposition newspapers. A private business with interests in state contracts in an economy still dominated by the state will usually decide caution is wiser than advertising in such publications.

Publications not aligned with the authorities must kowtow to state-owned printing facilities. Distribution of opposition publications outside Baku is often obstructed. In the capital city of Baku, unregistered newspaper vendors – the type who sell opposition newspapers – are finding that law enforcers are increasingly tough. The court system is subordinated to the executive, and therefore journalists, editors, and publishers do not have meaningful legal recourse.

Journalists are also subject to physical abuse and risk death. In March of this year, Elmar Huseinov, editor at the opposition magazine Monitor, was gunned down in the stairwell of his apartment building in Baku. Why he was killed and by whom is unclear. We may never learn the whole story behind the murder of this opposition journalist, but the case and the investigation surrounding it is emblematic of the dreadful press environment in the country.

The bill of particulars on the authorities’ intimidation and restrictions are laid out in detail in a recent report (issued July 14, 2005) by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s rapporteur on freedom of the press, Miklos Haraszti, who paints a bleak picture. (The OSCE report can be accessed at http://www.osce.org/documents/pdf_documents/2005/07/15790-1.pdf.)

Mr. Haraszti rightfully emphasizes the role of television in his report. The OSCE representative said that it is “hard to overestimate the importance of television, which is the main source of information for [Azerbaijan’s] citizens.”

While there is still some degree of pluralism in Azerbaijan’s print media, in television there is virtually none. There are 16 television channels in Azerbaijan, four of which broadcast to a national audience. All four channels with national reach have clear or believed links to the regime. For example, Lider TV is run by President Aliev’s cousin, Adalat Aliev. Space TV is owned by the president’s sister. ATV is widely believed to be controlled by the president’s powerful chief of staff, Ramiz Mehtiev.

One noteworthy development on the Azeri press and broadcast industry scene is the imminent unveiling of the country’s first public-service broadcasting channel, which is slated to hit the airwaves in August. Following the flawed 2003 presidential election, the Council of Europe, of which Azerbaijan is a member, adopted a resolution [Resolution 1358 (2004)] demanding that the government of Azerbaijan immediately implement a series of steps that included the creation of public service television to allow all political parties to better communicate with the country’s citizens.

While the Council of Europe for months exhorted the authorities in Baku to establish a genuinely independent and professional public broadcasting channel, the regime dragged its feet. Now, given the short time line until the elections, even if the authorities heed the Council of Europe’s call and implement both the spirit and the letter of the public-service broadcasting initiative, it may be a case of too little, too late.

With so much of the election infrastructure and process dominated by the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party apparatus, there is little room for non-regime forces to compete.

The regime has also been unresponsive to another concern of the Council of Europe: bringing into balance the composition of the Central Election Commission, whose membership remains stacked in favor of the regime. This, along with all the other advantages of unchecked incumbency, makes for a profoundly uneven electoral playing field.

Given the ferment growing throughout the former Soviet Union, all eyes are on Azerbaijan’s November elections. In states where regime security trumps rule of law and any sense of fair play, there is the potential for the average citizen’s frustration to boil over.

With the clock ticking toward the parliamentary elections, letting the airwaves flow in this tightly controlled country would be a salutary step for the integrity of November’s ballot, for the opening up of a much needed valve to relieve societal pressure – and for the country’s longer-term development and prosperity.

Mr. Walker is the director of studies at Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org).