Are France and America on the verge of making up? Efforts to heal the rift that developed during the run-up to the Iraq War have been going on for several weeks; and today’s tete-atete in Paris between Secretary of State Rice and President Chirac has been touted as a significant step toward improving relations.

It all began in November, when Mr. Chirac, in a handwritten post-election letter of congratulations, addressed President Bush as “Cher George.” In recent weeks, Foreign Minister Barnier has called for a “new relationship” between Washington and Paris; and Mr. Chirac has gone so far as to hail “the strength of the French-American friendship.” The two presidents are scheduled to dine together later this month at the summit in Brussels, Belgium of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and, in a highly publicized gesture of rapprochement, Mr. Chirac has accepted Mr. Bush’s invitation to visit his new chum at the White House.

How seriously should we take these diplomatic maneuverings? Are France and America about to enter a new era of friendly cooperation and mutual respect? Is it possible to chalk up the recent bad blood as a mere “lover’s spat,” a regrettable but ultimately forgivable episode in an otherwise amicable partnership?

History provides ample reason for skepticism. The last time that an American president sought to mend a severely fractured relationship with France was in 1969, when President Nixon, newly elected, jetted across the Atlantic with his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, for talks with Charles de Gaulle. Despite the chilly state of affairs caused by the French president’s decision to pull French troops out of NATO three years earlier, both Nixon and Mr. Kissinger greatly admired the imperious old lion of European politics and felt the time had come for a fresh start. Unfortunately, de Gaulle saw things differently. The man whom President Franklin Roosevelt had called a “nut” and President Truman a “psychopath” had a made a career of asserting his independence from the American colossus. He sent Nixon and Mr. Kissinger home with little more than a handshake and a few empty promises.

Contrary to popular belief, the history of Franco-American relations has been characterized less by goodwill and harmony than by friction, hostility, and, at times, outright war. From the French and Indian War of the 18th century to the Cold War of the 20th, American and French foreign policy has rarely been in agreement. Time and again, periods of antagonism have been followed by attempts at reconciliation, with predictable French appeals to the memory of the Marquis de Lafayette and Yorktown. Time and again, the relationship has reverted back to a pattern of rivalry and discord. Why should we expect things to be any different now?

Recent French diplomatic overtures may be nothing more than an acknowledgement of the decisiveness of Mr. Bush’s electoral victory and the reality of having to coexist over the next four years with a superpower led by the dreaded “neoconservatives.” The Iraqi elections of January 30 were such a resounding success that Mr. Chirac had little choice but to praise them publicly.

Certainly, significant differences in policy and outlook still divide both countries. In the Middle East, America favors change through democratic reform, while the French covet their friendships with many of the region’s despots. A flash point may come over Iran, where European-led negotiations have thus far failed to secure assurances that the terrorist state will abandon its nuclear ambitions. An American or Israeli preemptive strike would shatter such efforts. There is also the possibility that the European Union will ignore objections from America and lift the arms embargo against China.

By going to Paris, Ms. Rice may not be courting an old ally as much as conceding that France has become the de facto leader of a European Union that is a future rival to America. Few in Europe have forgotten Ms. Rice’s call two years ago to “forgive Russia, ignore Germany, and punish France” and many privately dream of the formation of an anti-American axis headquartered in Paris, Moscow, and Beijing. Both Mr. Bush and Ms. Rice undoubtedly know this and are aware that France can still make trouble for America.

But France could pay a hefty price for such independence. Many in the developing world may ultimately prefer America’s vision of liberty and self-determination to France’s cynical statecraft. For too long, democratic France has hidden behind the images of Lafayette and the Statue of Liberty while following a separate path that has frequently aided the enemies of freedom. With hope, she will find the courage and foresight to break with tradition.

Mr. Molesky, an assistant professor of history at Seton Hall University, is co-author, with John J. Miller, of “Our Oldest Enemy: A History of America’s Disastrous Relationship with France.”