My Decker College education began in 2005. Four years earlier, I had gone to work for an investment firm that specialized in for-profit education and training companies. I felt, and still feel, that investments like these promote good business and good public policy, and that it is desirable for private for-profit companies to compete with and supplement the offerings of public educational institutions.

In early 2002, the investment firm, which has held interests in approximately 20 education and training companies, acquired a 20% minority interest in a school which trained commercial truck drivers and heavy equipment operators. Later in 2002, when the majority owners of the truck driving school acquired an institution called Decker College in Louisville, Ky., our firm was automatically entitled to a 20% stake in Decker as well. Many of Decker’s students were welfare recipients who took programs in entry level business technology, thus enabling them to enter the mainstream workforce.

By 2004, Decker College had expanded to offer training programs for high school graduates who wished to enter various subtrades of the construction industry. Most of Decker’s construction students were economically disadvantaged African-Americans and Hispanics; for them the construction industry, with an average wage over $18 an hour, represented a life changing opportunity. Decker’s programs addressed a crying need for skilled workers in the U.S. construction industry, providing journeyman-level skills in one year.

In late 2004, Decker’s programs in the construction industry were experiencing substantial growth. The majority owners of the college had had difficulty in recruiting experienced for-profit education executives to move to Louisville to help Decker make the transition from a promising start-up to a successful business. They asked my investment firm if I could temporarily assume a more active role with the company, specifically to assist in the management recruiting effort, as well as in outreach to major employers and financing sources in the construction industry. The firm agreed, and from January through May 2005, I spent four days a week representing Decker in these matters.

I interviewed approximately 20 management candidates from around the country, and successfully recruited a chief financial officer from Florida, a vice president of operations from Arizona, a vice president of admissions from California, a director of student financial aid from Georgia, and a chief operating officer from Colorado. All of these individuals possessed distinguished records in the for-profit higher education world. They moved, with their families, to Louisville. The new chief operating officer, who had been for many years the successful chief executive officer of a large for-profit technical university, agreed to succeed me as CEO of Decker College later in the year.

During those five months, I visited Decker’s campuses and met with dozens of students. The students spoke enthusiastically of their experiences at Decker. Surveys conducted by Decker’s academic department showed student satisfaction ratios of 90%. Over 95% answered “Yes” to the question, “Would you recommend Decker College to a friend?”

In June, 2005, during the course of a program review of Decker, the U.S. Department of Education determined that Decker owed substantial refunds to the government on account of some students not completing their studies in the agreed upon time frame. Although both Decker and the DOE understood that Decker was owed reimbursements by the government in excess of the amount of refunds owed to the government, the DOE decided to temporarily suspend Decker’s access to federal student aid, advising Decker that access to federal funds would probably resume in two or three months.

Because federal student aid constituted 85% of Decker’s operating revenues, non-federal sources of funding had to be accessed to keep the school running and avoid interruption to the education of its students. Accordingly, Decker’s shareholders put several million dollars into the company and I personally put in $530,000. This was an instinct that came more from the heart than the wallet, as it was roughly $100,000 more than the total compensation I received from Decker during 2005.

From June through September 2005, most of my efforts on behalf of Decker consisted of working with the company’s legal counsel in Washington, D.C., to persuade the DOE to release the net federal funds owed to Decker. As an alternative, we sought to have the government cooperate with Decker to permit a transfer of Decker’s students to another educational institution, so that they could complete their studies.

Between June and September, Decker was forced to cut the size of its weekly entering classes and delay some of its course offerings, to ensure that the college would be able to continue operating until the release of federal funds, which appeared imminent. This entailed some disruption for both students and employees.

I still had hopes Decker would make it, and was doing everything I could to break the logjam in Washington, when in early September 2005, I learned from Decker’s legal counsel that the FBI had opened an investigation of allegations of possible criminal wrongdoing at Decker College. Having been a federal prosecutor for seven years, a United States attorney and an assistant U.S. attorney general in Washington working closely with the FBI, my automatic response was to immediately call the FBI and offer to help the investigation in any way I could at any time.

Sadly, the dispute with the DOE regulators could not be resolved in time. In late September, the DOE notified Decker that the suspension of federal aid for Decker students would not be lifted, and that the net funds owing to Decker would not be released. No business can operate without revenue, and within days Decker was forced into bankruptcy proceedings, which of course had an immediate disruptive impact on all Decker’s students, vendors, and employees.

In my opinion, this outcome was a tragedy that could have been averted if government regulators had simply released the net funds admittedly owing to Decker, or facilitated a transfer of Decker’s students to another educational institution. I lost money as did our firm’s investors, but more unfortunately, the most innocent and most needy – the students – became the biggest victims.

I have no doubt that, given a reasonable amount of time, the management team I recruited during the first five months of my involvement would have straightened out any problems that may have existed at Decker either at or prior to my arrival in Louisville. I regret that we could not convince the DOE to release funds it owed to Decker to give the new management a chance, but I am quite sure that nobody worked harder, or invested more effort in trying to prevent Decker College from closing, than I did.

Mr. Weld served as the Assistant U.S.Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division during the Reagan Administration. He was governor of Massachusetts from 1991 to 1997. A New York native, he is a Republican candidate for governor of New York.