It is perhaps the saddest tenet of the world we live in that the first casualty of war is the truth. And it is unfortunate that in the modern information age, with 24-hour cable news networks and countless Web sites providing nearly instantaneous on-demand news content, this basic truism is increasingly becoming a danger to America’s national security.

This week came the good news that a senior member of Al Qaeda, Abu Faraj al-Libbi, had been captured. Unfortunately, there was also the incorrect assertion that Mr. al-Libbi was the operational chief of the Al Qaeda network. Sadly, in our modern world, we tend to believe that quantity of reporting equals quality of truth, even though the vast majority of these kinds of stories are just a repetition of the initial reports.

Rarely does anyone question something such as Mr. al-Libbi’s actual role in Al Qaeda. In reality, we only know for sure that Mr. al-Libbi has been implicated in two assassination attempts against Pervez Musharraf. Other than that, all the other reports of his role within Al Qaeda consist of speculation by senior Pakistani officials.

It is telling that Mr. al-Libbi never appeared on America’s list of most-wanted terrorists. In fact, there is no indication that there was ever even a reward for the specific capture of Mr. al-Libbi by the American government. Many must be wondering then why he is being listed as the no. 3 military-operations head of Al Qaeda. Simply put, this is a prime example of the press, those seeking its attention, and individuals with an agenda creating a comfortable reality that is never subject to scrutiny.

To begin to unravel the myth from the reality, one must start with the events following the two failed assassination attempts on Mr. Musharraf. Pakistan’s government was the first to tie Mr. al-Libbi to those attacks. At this time, there is no reason or evidence to doubt that he was involved. However, with the announcement on August 18, 2004, of a reward from the government of Pakistan for Mr. al-Libbi’s capture came a “leak” from Pakistani Intelligence, or ISI, to the Agence France-Presse news service.

This leak was that Mr. al-Libbi, in addition to being wanted in the attacks on Mr. Musharraf, was also no. 3 within Al Qaeda as well as its military commander. He supposedly rose to this position following the March 2003 capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Three days later, a former American official, Richard Clarke, speaking to ABC, added credence to ABC’s version of this leak from the ISI when he said, “He [Mr. al-Libbi] appears to be the director of operations, which was the role that was performed by Sheikh Mohammed, the man who planned the 9/11 attacks.”

Once they are elevated to this level of press coverage, these kinds of reports tend to take on a nearly self-evident aura of truth that is hard to fight against, not only in the public/press domains, but also to some extent within the intelligence community. However, there are several problems with this version of the truth.

To begin with, Mr. Clarke’s credibility is based on his being a former government official specializing in terrorism. However, he had resigned in February 2003, a month before Mr. Mohammed was arrested. In addition, it is possible that Mr. Clarke was either distracted by his book deal, paying attention to the events surrounding the American-led liberation of Iraq, or, in an example of pure incompetence, had missed the fact that when Mr. Mohammed was arrested, Saif al-Adil, who had been chief of security for Al Qaeda, was reported by multiple independent sources to have taken over Mr. Mohammed’s position within Al Qaeda.

Mr. al-Adil, who is believed to be currently in Iran with other senior Al Qaeda leaders, is under the protection of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. In addition, his reported promotion, at either the end of March or the beginning of April 2003, was a full 15 months before anyone had heard of Mr. al-Libbi. There is also every indication that Mr. al-Adil has remained in the position of military commander of Al Qaeda since April 2003.There are, of course, other reasons to accept Mr. al-Adil as the actual commander.

First, he is known to have been involved in the planning and execution of every major Al Qaeda operation.

Second, he is an Egyptian, which is important when one considers that most of those in Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s inner circle of leadership are predominantly Egyptian or Saudi.

Third, Mr. al-Adil has been mentioned in connection to attacks in multiple nations, whereas Mr. al-Libbi has only been tied to the two attempts on Mr. Musharraf’s life, and possibly some minor attacks in Pakistan.

Fourth, although there was a senior member of Al Qaeda named al-Libbi – Ibn Sheikh al-Libbi, who oversaw Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan – he was actually captured back in December 2001 or January 2002.

In addition, it should be noted that when one joins Al Qaeda, an individual receives a new name that he is henceforth known by, and his last name is usually the country from which he comes. Thus, Al Qaeda members of Libyan origin bear the last name al-Libbi. So Abu Farraj al-Libbi and Ibn Sheikh al-Libbi might have had nothing more than their membership in Al Qaeda and their Libyan nationality in common.

Now there are, of course, the reports that Abu Farraj al-Libbi was the personal secretary to Mr. bin Laden and that he was overseeing Al Qaeda cells in America and the United Kingdom, which seem to bolster the claim by the Pakistan ISI that he is the no. 3 man. Unfortunately, the source behind these reports is the Pakistanis themselves, who leaked this bit to the London Telegraph in September 2004. This also contradicts the known connection of, once again, Saif al-Adil to attacks in Europe, and the fact that Mr. al-Zarqawi regularly coordinates his actions in Iraq and the failed attacks in Rome and London with Mr. al-Adil.

So why, then, would our good friends in Pakistan tell the press these interesting stories about Mr. al-Libbi? The answer to this is known only to them, but the possibilities range from a desire for increased American assistance in tracking down a threat to Mr. Musharraf and their internal security to that they want to maintain their relevance to America, with its associated flow of aid in an environment where most American attention has shifted in recent months to Iraq.

Then again, it could be something entirely different. However, what is known is that believing a lie and misunderstanding the true nature of the threat environment in the post-September 11 world is not only dangerous, it is potentially catastrophic.

Mr. Brown works at the Hudson Institute for the Program on Transitions to Democracy.