After hundreds of thousands of deaths, the displacement of about 3 million people, and the destruction of the tribal way of life of the people of Darfur; after the establishment and deployment of an African Union “peacekeeping” force of 7,000 men supported by American logistics and $170 million; after President Bush called the human catastrophe “genocide” and demanded U.N. action, Jan Pronk, U.N. special envoy to Sudan, has said, “Looking back at three years of killings and (ethnic) cleansing in Darfur, we must admit that our peace strategy so far has failed. All we did was pick up the pieces and muddle through, doing too little, too late.”

Mr. Pronk, it appears, has been educated by, or perhaps haunted by the multitude of men, women, and children murdered outright or starved into submission by the Darfur rebels with the active support of the Sudanese government under the protection of the threat of a Chinese veto of Security Council action. (China has a large stake in the oil riches of southern Sudan, and thus supports the government in Khartoum regardless of the depredations it heaps upon its citizens.) According to media reports, Mr. Pronk “appealed to [the U.N. Security Council] to undertake a transition from the African Union mission to a UN force of … peacekeepers with the authority to use violence to prevent attacks against civilians and disarm militias.” (My emphasis)

Aside from the syntactical oddity, Mr. Pronk is on to something.

A “war strategy” – the authority to use violence – might, in fact, be more effective and humane than a “peace strategy.” The militias are waging war against the people of Darfur and warriors – people authorized to use violence – are needed to protect the people and kill, yes, kill, the perpetrators. There is no reason to believe anything less will stop the Janjaweed ravaging of an already ravaged people.

One of the most bizarre notions born of the late 20th century is that people who kill, loot, maim, rape, pillage, and blow up buses are driven by circumstance to their evil deeds and can be convinced by diplomacy to stop. There is an implicit assumption that killers have an agenda amenable to compromise or purchase. It further assumes that at least some of the killers’ claims have merit that diplomats – and victims – should consider. It is on a par with the notion that sharing power with terrorists will “moderate” them, making them aware of potholes, civil rights, and the requirements for peaceable relations among nations.

But it is often the case that one party’s agenda is the death of its enemy and the acquisition of its physical and intellectual space and/or property. Janjaweed, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda give no evidence of interest in the achievement of some of their goals or satisfaction of some of their claims. The benefits of a Western-style “win-win” situation eludes them.

To the extent that Mr. Pronk is successful in convincing the United Nations that killing the killers is the fastest route to peace, the people of Darfur may yet have hope.

Ms. Bryen is director of special projects at the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs in Washington, D.C.