Polk, Conservative Internationalist

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In foreign policy debates, Democrats like Barack Obama invoke the spirit of Woodrow Wilson and the tradition of multilateral diplomacy to spread freedom. Republicans like John McCain admire the vigor of Teddy Roosevelt and the practice of balancing military power to preserve world order. The two traditions, known as liberal internationalism and realism, make for different priorities of the role of diplomacy and force.

But a third tradition, which might be called conservative internationalism, highlights the interaction between force and diplomacy — conservative because like realism it understands the need to use force, but internationalist because like liberal internationalism it seeks to expand freedom, not just preserve world order.

The standard bearer of this tradition is President Polk. Polk was one of the most ambitious and successful presidents in American history. In four years, he expanded American territory by 60% to incorporate Texas, the northwest territory of Oregon, and the southwest territories of New Mexico and California. And he did all this as a lame duck president facing a phalanx of presidential wannabes because he promised upon his nomination in 1844 to serve only one term.

Polk is ranked among the top 10 American presidents by historians. Yet he is virtually unknown to the American public. Why is that? Partly because he did not succeed without an imperialist war against Mexico and he unleashed the passions of racism and slavery that drove the country into civil war a decade and a half later. But it is also because his leadership did not fit the mold of either realism or liberal internationalism.

Polk’s diplomacy displayed three key features of conservative internationalism: He pursued the expansion of freedom and union, not its preservation as realists advocate. He linked force and diplomacy continuously, not giving priority to force as realism does or to diplomacy as liberal internationalism does. And he knew when to compromise to preserve domestic support, not assuming that elites know best as realists do or that the use of force requires multilateral consent as liberal internationalists do.

Unlike his more illustrious predecessor, Andrew Jackson, Polk used force to buttress his diplomacy to annex Texas. In early 1845 he ordered American troops under Zachary Taylor to move from Louisiana to the Texas border and sent additional naval forces to the Gulf Coast. By early summer, as Sam Haynes wrote in his book, “James K. Polk and the Expansionist Impulse,” “Washington aimed to send a clear and unequivocal message to Mexico and Great Britain that it would brook no interference in its plans to annex Texas.” This assertive deployment of American forces clearly reinforced local support for annexation. In June the Texas Congress approved annexation, and in July a convention ratified it.

In acquiring Oregon, Polk displayed the patience necessary to sustain public opinion. After Britain rejected an initial compromise based on the 49th parallel, Polk refused to make another offer even though presidential wannabes in both his cabinet and the Congress pressed him to compromise again.

Instead he armed his diplomacy by asking and ultimately receiving from Congress authorization to terminate unilaterally joint agreements with Britain for the administration of Oregon. Staring John Bull in the eye, even though it might have meant war with Britain at the same time war loomed with Mexico, worked. One year later Britain relented, and the Oregon boundary was settled at the 49th parallel.

Polk’s crowning performance as a standard bearer of conservative internationalism came in the Mexican war. From the beginning he thoroughly linked force and diplomacy. On three different occasions, he maneuvered military forces — in 1845 to position U.S. forces on the disputed Rio Grande border, in 1846 to launch attacks against Monterrey and California, and in 1847 to open a second front in Veracruz to assault Mexico City.

On each occasion, he simultaneously dispatched a diplomatic emissary to urge the Mexicans to settle peacefully — John Slidell, John’s brother Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, and finally Nicholas Trist. Even though Trist defied Polk’s orders, Polk eventually accepted the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo negotiated by Trist. His willingness to do so undoubtedly held at bay the All Mexico Movement in Congress calling for the annexation of the whole of Mexico.

A timely compromise at the peak of his military power enabled Polk to sustain domestic support, avoid an untenable occupation of Mexico, and complete the expansion of the country before it dissolved in civil war.

Democrats and Republicans, especially presidential candidates, Senators Obama and McCain, might well study the diplomacy of President Polk. Both candidates agree that American diplomacy should spread freedom but Mr. Obama assumes that can be done mostly by diplomacy, and Mr. McCain thinks it can be done mostly by force.

Neither suggests how the two can be combined and when it is necessary to compromise to sustain domestic support.

Mr. Nau is a professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and author this month of “Conservative Internationalism” in Policy Review.


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