On June 12, a Palestinian mob loyal to Palestinian Authority leader Mahmud Abbas ransacked the Palestinian parliament and cabinet buildings, touching off a fresh spate of internecine violence between Hamas and Fatah.

While the demonstrators’ stated goal was payment of salary arrears, the tension goes deeper. Since a January 2006 Hamas victory in legislative elections ended Fatah’s 12-year monopoly on Palestinian political power, Abbas and Fatah loyalists have fought – often violently – to preserve their political influence. At its core, the dispute involves Palestinian willingness to abide by diplomatic agreements and eschew demands to eradicate Israel.

Hamas’s refusal to recognize Israel or renounce terrorism has led the European Union and United States to cut off aid to the Palestinian Authority. Abbas seeks to bypass Hamas intransigence by taking the matter directly to the Palestinian people with a referendum on the future of the two state solution.

Bush administration officials applaud his move. On June 6, White House spokesman Tony Snow welcomed the proposal, stating, “Abbas has demonstrated that he’s somebody who wants to work toward a two state solution.” His State Department counter part, Sean McCormack, echoed this sentiment three days later.

Abbas may try to paint himself as a moderate and potential peacemaker in Western eyes, but such a perception is diplomatic smoke and mirrors. He seeks to base his referendum on the “prisoners’ document”- an 18-point manifesto calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the West Bank and Gaza. But the document espouses a final solution not unlike that proposed by Hamas. Not only does it fail to acknowledge Israel’s explicit right to exist, but it also endorses organized resistance – a euphemism for terrorism, calls for the release of all Palestinian prisoners including terrorists who murdered women and children inside Israel, and insists on refugees’ right of return. Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis recently referred to the latter clause as a “polite equivalent for the liquidation of Israel.”

The document sidesteps the international community’s demands of Hamas, which would require renunciation of violence, recognition of Israel, and adherence to past bilateral agreements.

Abbas’s sanctioning of the prisoners’ document signals Fatah’s radicalization. State Department officials should judge diplomatic progress not by what officials say, but upon what they do. That Abbas speaks of moderation does not make him a moderate. Nor should a favorable juxtaposition to Hamas be enough to suggest that Fatah no longer espouses terrorism.

Nor will the referendum, if approved, rein in Hamas. The vote would be not about Palestinian recognition of the Jewish state, but rather about whether the Palestinian public seeks a secular Palestinian state to eradicate Israel or a Hamas-led one that seeks to “raise the banner of Allah over every inch of mandatory Palestine.”

Abbas may win the referendum. A June 6 Birzeit University poll found that 77% of Palestinians surveyed support the prisoners’ document. Any national consensus that emerges from such a referendum will solidify the Palestinian negotiating position for years to come. In doing so, it will hamstring the efforts of future Palestinian interlocutors seeking flexibility on a host of final-status issues. Using Western and Palestinian dissatisfaction with Hamas to endorse a solution equally rejectionist will provide no solution.

The willingness of U.S. and European negotiators to settle for the image rather than substance of peace process progress has a long history of failure. Until they change course, their support for Abbas’s referendum will do more to prevent peace than achieve it.

Mr. Azarva is a research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute.