The U.S. State Department has announced that the planned Mideast Conference will now be held in Annapolis — not at Camp David. The reason apparently is due to the bad memories from the Clinton-Barak-Arafat debacle there.

During her recent visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority, Secretary of State Rice had one over-riding message: Let’s move quickly to create a Palestinian State and, essentially echoing the Arab position, address the “critical issues” — Jerusalem, borders, settlements, refugees — now.

Ms. Rice may have felt encouraged, perhaps mistakenly, by what she understood to be the positions of Prime Minister Olmert, which, according to press reports, were the following: Jerusalem is to be divided between Israel and the Palestinian State, the latter to include not only Arab peripheral neighborhoods but also most parts of the Old City.

Also, Israel will relinquish its sovereignty over the Temple Mount and will agree to see the vulnerable pre-67 Green Line as the main parameter for the future border.

In exchange for three settlement blocks, Maale Adumim, Gush Etzion, Ariel, which will remain Israel’s, Israel will cede to the Palestinians stretches of land west of the Green Line. Prime Minister Sharon spoke about five settlement blocks, including the strategically important Jordan valley.

Other settlements, including some strategic ones, will be evacuated. Israel purportedly will agree to a Palestinian controlled “safe passage” from Gaza to the West Bank. Another possible major Israeli concession refers to the question of Palestinian refugees. According to press reports the Israeli negotiators have consented to make do with something less than a final and formal Palestinian renunciation of the so-called “right of return,” while agreeing to the entry of 1,000 families to Israel.

True, nothing is carved in stone at this point, and the growing opposition to those proposals inside Mr. Olmert’s own Kadima party may still bring about real or cosmetic changes, and even Mr. Olmert himself may have second thoughts.

In any case, nobody even faintly acquainted with reality genuinely believes that the international get-together in November will produce anything resembling real peace. What it might do, however, mostly to the detriment of Israel, is create new terms of reference for any future negotiations. Terms which will trade the heretofore generally accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 which makes possible withdrawals contingent on security considerations for a formula more or less equivalent to the “Arab Peace Plan.”

America’s motives and intentions in promoting the Annapolis Conference may be entirely praiseworthy, in spite of the view of some that in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, American eyes mainly will be focused on the Iraqi situation.

In other words, hoping that even a temporary achievement on the one front would, in the eyes of history, make the country less of a failure on the other front.

There is a view that the relative political weakness the head of the present Israeli government, according to a recent Maariv poll evaluating different Israeli prime ministers, that his public approbation hovers around 0%.

Though Mahmoud Abbas, who is generally regarded as largely ineffective in spite of the support he enjoys from Israel and the international community, might make it easier to achieve an agreement in November. According to this theory, Mr. Olmert needs some sort, any sort, of political momentum in order to get out of the political doldrums.

While Mr. Abbas, for similar reasons, wants to change the perception of him amongst Palestinians by making tough statements for public consumption. This may work in the short run, but it doesn’t bode well for the long-term prospects of peace.

In addition to her protracted sessions with Mr. Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni, the secretary also had separate talks with Minister of Defense Barak and Likud leader Netanyahu.

While Mr. Barak apparently made it clear that though he supported her efforts, he didn’t believe that Mr. Abbas was capable of implementing any agreement. He also specified that Israeli road blocks and other security measures would not be dismantled anytime soon.

The talk with the leader of Israel’s opposition covered a wider range of subjects, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, and matters relating to the broader Middle East. On the Israeli-Palestinian issue, Mr. Netanyahu made it clear that a Likud-led government would put peace at the top of its agenda, but not according to the Arabs’ “all or nothing” approach.

He reminded the Ms. Rice of the commitment made by President Bush in his letter to Prime Minister Sharon to support Israel’s right to security — related borders which are not to be identical with the former Green Line — a commitment which followed similar statements by, among others, President Reagan.

He also pointed out the folly of dividing Jerusalem, a plan which if carried out would bring Al Qaeda and Hamas to the walls of Old Jerusalem and to the Temple Mount. Summing up, he told Ms. Rice that Palestinian statehood shouldn’t be a rush-job.

First there must be institution-building, economic reform, and concrete proof of Mr. Abbas’s capability and willingness to deal with terrorism. Furthermore, there must be no more unilateral concessions.

Perhaps, as a result of what she heard and saw in Israel and in Ramallah, Secretary Rice, on her way back to America, said, “We have many things to do.”

Mr. Shoval, Israel’s ambassador to America between 1990 and 1993 and from 1998 to 2000, is president of the Israel-American Chamber of Commerce.