Perhaps with a reawakened sense of realism — and being aware of the unpopularity of both the Israeli and Palestinian leaders, President Bush has now redefined the aims of Annapolis: Palestinian statehood will not happen by the end of his term, but he should be able to set the definition of a Palestinian state.

There are more than a few views about the Annapolis Conference and its consequences, but schematically there are five principal reactions:

1. those who didn’t think that the necessary ingredients for peace, including suitable leaderships, were there yet,

2. Israelis who opposed it for either ideological or pragmatic reasons, especially security-linked reasons, while amongst Palestinians there are those who have either not given up their dream of eliminating the Jewish State altogether or who doubt whether the proposed Palestinian mini-state has much of a chance to be “viable” or to survive.

3. the few who believe that Annapolis has generated a process which could actually lead to peace at some time in the future,

4. others, much less confident, but for reasons linked to domestic politics, especially in Israel, and with an eye toward Washington, who declare their undying support for it. This, if one fine-tunes what Prime Minister Olmert says, means in effect: “what I really need is the process, not necessarily the outcome — so that I can present myself to the public as the leader who has to be kept in power in order to give peace a chance.”

5. those, probably the majority, who say “it doesn’t really matter, nothing will come out of it anyway … “

In the meantime the talks about the core issues — Jerusalem, refugees, borders, settlements — have begun. But even if there could be an agreement — which means President Abbas declaring that the “right of return” is dead and buried, or recognizing Israel as the State of the Jewish people, or Mr. Olmert agreeing to withdraw completely to the vulnerable “Green Line” and to divide Jerusalem, etc — implementation is not imaginable under present circumstances.

Though one cannot rule out that, by the end of this year, the two sides could agree on a document that will refer to some of those core issues although implementing the agreements would be much less likely to happen. If one listens to Mr. Olmert and his defense minister, Ehud Barak, that’s what they say. There is even less likely a chance of Palestinian implementation, in view of Mr. Abbas’s total lack of authority and considering that his views do not differ from those of his predecessor, Yasser Arafat. Moreover, given Hamas’s control of Gaza and the near certainty that without the continued presence of Israel’s security forces in the West Bank, Hamas would take over there too. This reality has now been underscored by the recent fiasco in Gaza.

The inevitable outcome of such an agreement will, in all likelihood, be that Israel will have committed itself to far reaching steps. These steps will be the starting point for any future negotiations as well as inviting increasing international pressure on Israel as well as the terrorized attempts on the state.

In other words, a paper agreement does not mean peace. Moshe Dayan said almost 30 years ago that it will be difficult to have a written document that both Israelis and Palestinian can live with. This statement still holds true today.

What’s more, such a virtual peace may abort or at least delay possible concrete progress, including, economic progress, which could potentially create an environment of real as opposed to virtual peace and make it clearer to Israelis and Palestinians what and how Palestinian self-governance could actually look like. Statehood is one option — in the eyes of many perhaps the only option — but options, unless they are backdated, by definition are something to be exercised in the future and only if the price is right.

Annapolis was originally touted, including in Israel, primarily as a way to create an effective front against Iran. But, if that was the case, then the American intelligence report published a few days after Annapolis, made nonsense of that intention. Moreover, the fact that in the last few weeks one actually sees a rapprochement between Iran and those “moderate” Arab regimes, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Iran is indeed the most worrying factor — but using it as a pretext in the Israeli-Palestinian equation is not helpful, either in confronting Iran’s ambitions or in trying to promote peace between Israel and the Arab World. In fact, the Coalition of Moderates has not brought about a more moderate stance with regards to the Israel-Palestinian issue. Actually, it may mean the opposite, namely an effort to show Arab, including Palestinian public opinion, that those “moderates” are tough on Israel. Furthermore, those “moderates” could force Israel to make concessions, which would not be good.

Mr. Shoval, Israel’s ambassador to America between 1990 and 1993 and from 1998 to 2000, is president of the Israel-American Chamber of Commerce.