Winning the War of Ideas

This article is from the archive of The New York Sun before the launch of its new website in 2022. The Sun has neither altered nor updated such articles but will seek to correct any errors, mis-categorizations or other problems introduced during transfer.

The New York Sun

During my confirmation hearings, Senator Lieberman called me “the supreme allied commander in the war of ideas.” I like the ring of that — even though I haven’t asked our allies if they agree. While the under secretary of state for public diplomacy has a big portfolio, the war of ideas will be my focus.

Unless we get the war of ideas right, we will never succeed in meeting the most significant threat of our time. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it well in a speech on July 16: “Over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. Non-military efforts — these tools of persuasion and inspiration — were indispensable to the outcome of the defining ideological struggle of the 20th century. They are just as indispensable in the 21st century — and perhaps even more so.”

During the Cold War, after a slow start, we became good at public diplomacy, with such institutions as the Congress of Cultural Freedom and Radio Free Europe. But starting in the early 1990s, America, in bipartisan fashion, began to dismantle this arsenal of influence. In its 2003 report, the Djerejian Group, a commission of which I was a member, would call, in desperation, for “a new strategic direction — informed by a seriousness and commitment that matches the gravity of our approach to national defense and traditional state-to-state diplomacy.”

Today, the environment has changed. Budgets have risen. Backing is bipartisan. There’s a lot of talk — as usual in Washington — about restructuring public diplomacy. Structure is important, but two things are far more important: will and strategy.

The will now exists. Does the seriousness and commitment match that of our approach to national defense and state-to-state diplomacy? No. But we’re swiftly moving in the right direction. Our intention is to help build a strong foundation for a program of vigorous public diplomacy for the next administration — a public diplomacy endowed with both adequate resources and with intellectual gravity. But at the same time, we plan to accomplish a great deal in the six months left in this administration.

As for strategy, we intend to use the traditional tools of public diplomacy: education and cultural exchanges; advocacy and information programs via personal contact, electrons and ink on paper; and, through the independent government agency, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which I used to chair, TV and radio transmissions in 60 languages, reaching an audience of 175 million per week — up 75% in the past six years.

And then, there is the war of ideas. This endeavor draws on the work of traditional public diplomacy, but, overall, it is more closely focused.

Understand, first, that the under secretary is dual-hatted: I lead the part of public diplomacy that resides at State, and I head the government-wide effort on the war of ideas — which includes coordination with the private sector as well.

The focus of today’s war of ideas is counterterrorism. As the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism of 2006 puts it: “In the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas.”

So let me be specific. Our mission today in the war of ideas is highly focused. It is to use the tools of ideological engagement — words, deeds, and images — to create an environment hostile to violent extremism. We want to break the links among groups like Al Qaeda and their target audiences.

Unlike traditional functions of public diplomacy like education and cultural exchanges, the aim of the war of ideas is not to persuade foreign populations to adopt more favorable views of America and its policies. Instead, the war of ideas tries to ensure that negative sentiments and day-to-day grievances toward America and its allies do not manifest themselves in the form of violent extremism.

Let me put this another way. In the war of ideas, our core task is not how to fix foreigners’ perceptions of the United States. Those perceptions are important — we want foreign publics to trust and respect us. But America’s image is not at the center of the war of ideas.

Instead, we need to recognize that there is a complex, multi-sided battle going on in Muslim societies for power. This is a battle in which we cannot be a bystander. Instead, the battle within many Muslim societies for power affects America directly and was responsible for the deaths of 3,000 people seven years ago. In this battle, our main role is to support constructive alternatives to violent extremism.

Our priority is not to promote our brand but to help destroy theirs. We do that by showing foreign populations that the ideology and actions of the violent extremists are not in the best interests of those populations.

It is the fact that the battle is going on within Muslim society that makes our role so complicated and that requires that we ourselves not do much of the fighting. The most credible voices in this war of ideas are Muslim.

So here is our ultimate goal: A world in which the use of violence to achieve political, religious, or social objectives is no longer considered acceptable; efforts to radicalize and recruit new members are no longer successful; and the perpetrators of violent extremism are condemned and isolated.

How do we achieve such a world? Three ways:

First, by confronting the ideology that justifies and enables the violence. We try to remove the fake veneer on the reputation of extremists and allow publics to see the shame and hostility of life in terrorism. That is what worked in Al Anbar province in Iraq, as well as in Jordan and Morocco. Support for suicide bombing throughout the Muslim world has dropped sharply. The proportion of Jordanians with “a lot of confidence in Osama bin Laden” has fallen to 20% in 2007 from 56% in 2003.

This is an effort that requires credible Muslim voices to work effectively — especially voices of those, like Fadl, born Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, and known as Dr. Fadil, whose story was told recently by Lawrence Wright in the New Yorker. Fadl helped build the Al Qaeda ideology and now repudiates it for its wanton violence.

We also should not shrink from confidently opposing poisonous ideas — even if they are rooted in a twisted interpretation of religious doctrine.

Second, we achieve our desired goal by offering, often in cooperation with the private sector and using the best technology including Web 2.0 social networking techniques, a full range of productive alternatives to violent extremism.

The shorthand for this policy is diversion — powerful and lasting diversion, the channeling of potential recruits away from violence with the attractions of culture, literature, music, technology, sports, education, and entrepreneurship, in addition to politics and religion.

While winning hearts and minds would be an admirable feat, the war of ideas adopts the more immediate and realistic goal of diverting impressionable segments of the population from the recruitment process. The war of ideas is really a battle of alternative visions, and our goal is to divert recruits from the violent extremist vision.

Going beyond diversion, we seek to build counter-movements by empowering groups and individuals opposed to violent extremism — movements (using both electronic and physical means) that bring people together — including believers in democratic Islam — with similar, constructive interests, such as mothers opposed to violence, built on the Mothers Against Drunk Driving model.

Our role is as a facilitator of choice. We help build networks and movements — put tools in the hands of young people to make their own choices, rather than dictating those choices. In the words of the National Security Strategy: “Freedom cannot be imposed; it must be chosen.”

We have already done a major reorganization — both at State and the interagency — to help in the overall effort. The five focal points of our programs are: Muslim society, especially involving young people, at the grassroots; Middle East elites, who involve themselves in ideology and religious doctrine; foreign fighters, who have poured into Iraq and Afghanistan; Iran; and private sector expertise.

There are signs that the war of ideas, even in its nascent stages, is working. But no serious person involved in this battle thinks it is close to being won. The flow of new recruits has not stopped. Our work is ahead of us.

In the end, the mission of 21st century public diplomacy is to tell the world of a good and compassionate nation and at the same time to engage in the most important ideological contest of our time. This engagement must, by its nature, involve non-Americans that we nurture, support, and encourage

The will, as I said, now exists. As for strategy: I think that we have it right. This is a contest that we have now engaged vigorously — a contest we will win.

Mr. Glassman was sworn in on June 10 as the under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs. He was formerly a journalist and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. This article is a revised version of a speech delivered at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on July 8.


The New York Sun

© 2025 The New York Sun Company, LLC. All rights reserved.

Use of this site constitutes acceptance of our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. The material on this site is protected by copyright law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, cached or otherwise used.

The New York Sun

Sign in or  Create a free account

or
By continuing you agree to our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use