JERUSALEM – The satirical Israeli show, “Wonderful Country,” has a bit where one of the regulars portrays the new foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, being interviewed on the national news. Asked to describe the platform of her new Kadima Party, she explains: “Our goal is to make peace with the people of P.”

“You mean the people of Palestine,” the interviewer interjects.

“We’re not sure,” the faux Minister Livni replies, “because that’s as far as Arik Sharon got.”

One week into the new government headed by Ehud Olmert – and a week and a half before his first visit to Washington as prime minister, significant confusion obtains over Mr. Olmert’s aims. Unlike his predecessor and political patron, Ariel Sharon, Mr. Olmert has laid many of his cards on the table. Mr. Olmert is not for a stand-pat policy, openly professing his intention to leave the great majority of the West Bank, along with 98% of the total Palestinian population, to pull down settlements and towns housing 70,000 Jewish settlers, and to withdraw behind the still-to-be completed Security Fence.

Doubts about Mr. Olmert’s ability to pursue this policy stems from the results of the March 28 election, which yielded a less favorable result than Mr. Olmert had expected and most polls had predicted. The vote was a setback for the parties of Israel’s hawkish right – former foreign minister Sylvan Shalom told me it was a “catastrophe” for his Likud Party – but it was hardly a resounding vote of confidence for Mr. Olmert’s proposed “convergence” plan, though what he lost in votes Mr. Olmert hopes he can make up by his candor. Mr. Sharon was bitterly criticized for having been elected on one platform and then switching policies midterm.

On the eve of Mr. Olmert’s visit to Washington for meetings with Mr. Bush and Congress, questions involve not only whether Mr. Olmert has sufficient parliamentary support for a super Gaza Disengagement. The numerical fragility of Mr. Olmert’s parliamentary backing is compounded by the intensity of the opposition his policy will evoke among settlers and their allies. The ratio of law police and soldiers to settlers in Gaza last summer was four-to-one. Law enforcement cannot dispatch anything like that ratio with regard to 70,000 settlers in the West Bank.

The financial costs are similarly daunting and the budget, which only just passed its first Knesset reading, is already strained. On top of that Mr. Olmert is counting on international support for the new lines. His trump card is the April 14, 2004, letter President Bush gave Mr. Sharon, which committed America to supporting changes in the old 1967 borders in recognition of the large Jewish towns that lie across that old (and never-recognized) border.

But the American position, as articulated by American diplomats, is that the Bush letter makes that pledge in the context of bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs – not as the result of unilateral Israel action. Mr. Bush is inclined to see Mr. Olmert pursue talks with the Palestinian Authority chairman, Mahmoud Abbas. It’s hard to imagine that he will suddenly summon the strength to dismiss the Hamas government or to ignore them. Doves hope that Abu Mazen concludes an agreement with Mr. Olmert and then submits it to the Palestinian voters in the form of a referendum.

Notwithstanding the low odds, Mr. Olmert told us he would refrain from implementing his unilateral plans for up to six months during which time Israel would explore the Abu Mazen option. His justice minister, Haim Ramon, later said that the government would wait through the end of calendar year 2006 – which is seven months away. This could be read as an ultimatum to the Palestinians: Get yourself together within six months or else; or as a sop to Washington, which is keen on not losing the European Union partnership within the Quartet.

Mr. Olmert’s public nod toward a six-month window during which a negotiated settlement might be pursued was intended to help prepare the talks in Washington. The premier will be looking for measurable signs of support – maybe financial assistance for the resettlement effort – but Mr. Bush’s room to maneuver is limited by the need for wide multilateral support on the Iran nuclear matter, not to mention the federal deficit. Publicly backing Mr. Olmert’s “convergence” plan would require a change in American policy.

Still, there is a lot of support for Israel in Washington, especially after the Gaza disengagement and the Hamas election. Making the case that there is no Palestinian partner for peace may not be a slam-dunk, but it now begins with shared assumptions about the terrorist religious extremists who govern the Palestinian Authority.

The thing you hear everywhere you go here – and from Arab diplomats as well – is that the clock is now ticking toward the end of Mr. Bush’s tenure. “We’ve got two years to make something happen,” is the gist of what officials say, describing a time frame explicitly endorsed last week by the Hashemite king. So in addition to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, add Palestine to the list of sensitive and dangerous problems the outcomes of which now depend on the dexterity and resilience of the Mr. Bush.

Mr. Twersky is a contributing editor of The New York Sun.