On general manager Omar Minaya’s watch, the Mets have both acted and performed like a big market team, spending large sums of money in the free agent market. That’s not the only area in which the team has let its wallet do the talking: Every summer, the Mets are also among the biggest spenders in the international free agent market, the one where 16-year-olds from Venezuela and the Dominican Republic land milliondollar deals.

But when it comes to the amateur draft, it’s a different story. Going into this month’s draft, the Mets had an opportunity to open their wallet once again, yet chose not to do so. Their cross-town rivals in the Bronx have matched the Mets dollar for dollar when it comes to signing talent, but they’ve also begun to flex their muscle in the draft, selecting those ‘signability problem’ players that others pass on, giving the Yankees talent rated well above the pick from which they are selected. It’s turned one of the worst farm systems in baseball into one that is flourishing, especially when it comes to pitching. However, the Mets, with no first-round pick and apparently in possession of money to burn, as well as a number of very good players falling on draft day because of perceived bonus demands, the team played it straight, doing little to enhance a minor league organization that is among the most shallow in the game.

Although the team sacrificed its first-round pick with the off-season signing of Moises Alou, it picked up two picks in the supplemental first round (at nos. 42 and 47) for the minor losses of Roberto Hernandez and Chad Bradford. With the first of the two picks, they selected Eddie Kunz, the closer for the eventual NCAA College World Series champions, Oregon State. Kunz certainly looks the role — at 6-foot-6-inches and somewhere between 250 and 260 pounds, he more closely resembles a football lineman than a pitcher, but his size certainly lends the much-desired intimidation factor to his game, and he backs it up with a mid-90s fastball. Unfortunately, size and velocity are the only strengths to his game. By using a low threequarters arm slot, Kunz is unable to create the downward plane normally associated with players his size, which gives them an advantage by adding an extra angle on his pitches. The fastball is also his only major-league ready pitch, as his slider tends to flatten out, and his changeup lacks deception. These weaknesses kept him good, but not great, during his college career, as even in his final amateur season, he failed to average a strikeout per inning, and his control wavered. In his defense, his sinking fastball made him a groundball machine, and he did not surrender a single home run in 31 appearances spanning 46.1 innings.

Prior to the draft, most teams had Kunz pegged as a second- or third-rounder. What then, did the Mets see in him? It’s possible that they were encouraged by the success of Joe Smith, last year’s thirdround pick who reached the majors with just 33 minor league innings under his belt and has proven to be an intricate piece to this year’s bullpen. Like Smith, Kunz is someone who was seen as a player who could move quickly, but maybe lacked the overall ceiling of many players being drafted in his round. The debate between ceiling and certainty is one that has been going on since the draft’s inception in 1965, and there is no right answer. Instead, it needs to be taken on a team-by-team level. For a big-money team like the Mets, they should be focusing on the big payoffs that go with taking risks on those high-upside/highwashout potential guys.

By picking Kunz, whom did the team miss out on? Matt Harvey, for one. A high school right-hander from Connecticut with an arm that throws lightning, Harvey was generally considered the second-best high school pitcher in the draft. There was one problem though: His agent was the notorious Scott Boras, and he would not come cheap. Boras clients such as Harvey often fall in the draft to a position far lower than their talent would suggest, and when Harvey dropped completely out of the first round, somebody was going to get an extra first-round talent — if they were willing to empty their checkbook. The Mets had that chance, and they passed. In the interest of fairness, the Boston Red Sox were in a similar situation to the Mets — no first-round pick and lots of money to spend — and they also went elsewhere. Harvey wasn’t selected until the third round, when the Angels of Anaheim found him too good to let slip. The Angels have a history of taking players like this; when Jered Weaver fell in the draft, they selected him, and he’s now part of one of the game’s top rotations. Two years ago, they selected a plummeting Nick Adenhart, who is now one of the top right-handed pitching prospects in baseball. How did they amass such talent? It was certainly not by selecting players like Eddie Kunz.

By getting quick returns on players such as Smith — the same path the Mets hope Kunz can take — the team isn’t really making much money (or saving it, depending on your angle). Both Smith and Kunz have top projections that take them into roles as quality setup men, not closers. That’s a job than can be filled on the free agent market for between $3 and $5 million, and that’s for a really good one. When you can draft or sign stars, as the Mets have with players such as David Wright and Jose Reyes, everything changes. Although the pair is playing like $15 to $20 million stars, both are pre-arbitration, and only making a fraction of that salary, allowing the Mets to allocate their money elsewhere until Wright and Reyes are in a position to earn the big money in a few years. It’s that kind of scouting and player development, and the associated financial flexibility that allows a team to build championships. Adding a new middle reliever every year, on the other hand, is not.

Mr. Goldstein is a writer for Baseball Prospectus. For more state-of-the-art commentary, visit baseballprospectus.com.