It seems like such a laughable premise: You stand in the way of my defender while I dribble around you. Yet this play, more commonly known as the pick-and-roll, is the staple of virtually every NBA offense. And when executed well, it is nearly impossible to stop. If you don’t believe me, just ask the Dallas Mavericks.

Trailing 3-2 in their second-round series against the Phoenix Suns, the Mavs are faced with the conundrum of stopping a pick-and-roll run by two of the game’s most dominant offensive players. Point guard Steve Nash starts with the ball and runs his man into a pick by Amare Stoudemire. Once he sets the pick, Stoudemire then turns and cuts toward the basket.

There are several options for how to defend this play. The easiest and most common is the switch: Stoudemire’s man picks up Nash, while Nash’s man picks up Stoudemire. But this has two major shortcomings. First, it creates two enormous mismatches. Nash is normally defended by a little guard, while Stoudemire is guarded by a lumbering big man.

After the switch, Nash has a huge speed advantage on Stoudemire’s defender, while Stoudemire can overpower Nash’s defender. Plus, Stoudemire automatically has a one-step advantage after the switch because he can turn and screen out Nash’s defender after he sets the screen, thus opening an easy path to the basket for a dunk. As a result, the switch is an unappealing solution.

A second option is the trap: Both defenders run toward the man with the ball and take their chances that he won’t be able to see the passing lane. But this requires a nimble big man who can close off the dribbler’s path long enough for the second defender to catch up to the play. Dallas doesn’t have these types of defenders, and hasn’t defended the pick-and-roll this way all season.

The third method of stopping the play is the “fight through it” approach. This requires Nash’s defender to battle through the screen and hope that he can get back to Nash in time to contest a shot. It worked for the Mavs early in Game 4 because Nash was surprised by the tactic and wasn’t looking to shoot the ball. Once he caught on, however, he exploded for 23 points in the third quarter and nearly led Phoenix to a comeback win. Realistically, it’s unreasonable to expect Nash’s defender to consistently get past the screen in time to cut off Nash’s path to the basket, so this strategy only works as a surprise tactic.

That leaves us with the final option: Help and recover. This means that Stoudemire’s defender steps out to pick up Nash just long enough for Nash’s defender to catch up to the play, and then races back to defend Stoudemire. A secondary defender also races in from the side to check Stoudemire until the big man can get back to him. Against most teams, this is a relatively effective strategy, but against the Suns, it has proven fruitless for three reasons.

First, Stoudemire’s defender is usually Erick Dampier, and he isn’t mobile enough to step out and meet Nash. Thus, Nash often has a wide-open jump shot when he comes off the pick. Several times in Game 5, Nash came off the pick unobstructed and had a clean look from 15 feet or closer, which is virtually a layup for him.

Second, Stoudemire is so quick that it’s impossible for the big man to get back to him in time after stepping out to meet Nash. After Stoudemire sets the screen, he cuts toward the basket. If the man guarding him steps out to block Nash’s path, Nash will drop a bounce pass in to Stoudemire near the foul line. From there, Stoudemire can take one step and dunk the ball. The big man has no chance of backtracking in time to stop it.

Third, it’s very difficult for secondary defenders to race in and check Stoudemire until the big man can get back. After watching Stoudemire throw down a few poster-quality dunks, the defense usually collapses around him when he rolls to the basket. But this doesn’t stop the play, it just moves it in a different direction. Nash now has 3-point shooters spotting up on one wing and along either corner. Once he sees where the help comes from, he simply zips the ball across the court to an open shooter. Since all three outside players (Shawn Marion, Quentin Richardson, and Jim Jackson) are capable 3-point shooters, he can’t choose wrong. So instead of giving up two points on a dunk, the defense gives up three on an outside bomb.

This is why the Suns finished the year as the second-best offense in history, based on my Offensive Efficiency formula. They primarily run one play, but because of the skill levels of the key players, it’s incredibly effective.

Dallas coach Avery Johnson has been determined to take away something on this play, but doing so has just opened bigger holes elsewhere. In Games 3, 4, and 5 he limited how much help he sent to the pick-and-roll to take away the open 3-pointers.

It hasn’t worked, as Nash and Stoudemire have taken advantage of the extra space. Nash has gone for 27, 48, and 34 points, while Stoudemire piled up 37, 15, and 33. They did it with ease, too: Amazingly, all 33 of Stoudemire’s points in Game 5 came on dunks, layups, and foul shots.

Dallas’s best answer for Game 6 isn’t a comforting one: They need to help early and often on the pick-and-roll and hope the Suns miss their 3-pointers. Forget help and recover – against this team, it’s help and hope. But anything is better than giving easy looks to the Suns’ two best players.

Unfortunately, the Suns’ pick-and-roll attack is so devastating that even without a key component (injured guard Joe Johnson), it still leaves defenses exasperated. Phoenix’s primary play may seem childlike in its simplicity, but figuring out how to stop it continues to torment grown men.