The recent arrest of a senior figure of an ISIS affiliate organization, Mehmet Gören, is reigniting accusations against Pakistan for providing safe havens to terrorist groups. Captured in a covert operation by Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in December 2025, Mr. Gören — also known by his codename Yahya — was accused of orchestrating suicide attacks and facilitating the operations of Islamic State Khorasan Province, known as ISIS-K.

In the wake of the arrest, a Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, released an audio message accusing Pakistan of harboring ISIS terrorists, claiming the Taliban had long monitored their activities and even shared intelligence that aided such operations. Mr. Mujahid described ISIS as a “sinister phenomenon.” He then warned that safe havens must not be used against any country, reflecting the assessment that Pakistan’s territory allegedly serves as a sanctuary for ISIS terrorists not only to challenge the Taliban leadership but to threaten countries like India.

Taliban statements about ISIS in Pakistan must be read with caution, but they are not easily dismissed. Regional observers have repeatedly pointed to evidence that Pakistan maintains a nexus with ISIS-K. In particular it has been highlighted that ISIS-K operatives are finding refuge in Pakistani provinces like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where training camps and recruitment networks reportedly operate with varying degrees of state tolerance or support.

Evidence of Pakistan’s links to ISIS-K has been accumulating over the years. In April 2024, Afghan authorities arrested Tajik recruits instructed to train in Quetta, Pakistan, before deployment to conflict zones. The Taliban’s foreign minister, Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, alluded to three neighboring countries aiding ISIS-K, with one providing recruits, another transit, and a third planning, training, and funding — widely interpreted as implicating Pakistan. The Baloch National Movement’s chairman, Naseem Baloch, claimed in March 2024 during a United Nations meeting that ISIS camps in Balochistan operate under Pakistani army supervision. 

Further corroboration comes from captured operatives. A founding ISIS-K member, Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost, stated in a video that Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence officers facilitated financial support for Pakistan-born Hafiz Saeed Khan, who was emir of ISIS–K until his death in July 2016. The 2020 arrest of ISIS-K’s chief, Aslam Farooqi, another Pakistani national, by Afghan forces revealed Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence links. Commenting on the arrests, a senior Afghan official stated: “The ISIS-K is just a demon child of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence.”

Recent reports, including a June 2024 issue of ISIS-K’s “Voice of Khorasan“ magazine, lambasted the Taliban for engaging with “non-believer” states like India, while issuing threats against New Delhi. Furthermore, the Indian Council of World Affairs think tank mentioned that intelligence reports show attempts by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence “to shift many ISIS-K cadres to the Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, to increase their disruptions in Jammu and Kashmir” against India.

Social media and activist accounts amplify these claims, with posts stating that ISIS training centers at Mastung, Balochistan, are under military protection. Locals at Mastung protested these settlements in 2024, condemning the Pakistani state for facilitating ISIS presence.

The arrest of Mr. Gören coincides with heightened regional tensions. On October 9, 2025, Pakistani aircraft struck Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan positions in Kabul. The strikes occurred amid Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to India and New Delhi’s decision to reopen the embassy in Kabul. 

For Pakistan, long reliant on its “strategic depth“ doctrine — viewing Afghanistan as a buffer against India — these developments represent a collapse of influence. The Taliban, for all its rigidity, is no longer Islamabad’s “compliant client.” Kabul’s rulers act as nationalists first and Islamists second, asserting autonomy in ways that expose Pakistan’s shrinking leverage. Critics fear that, having “lost” Afghanistan, Pakistan may leverage networks like ISIS-K to destabilize the region, particularly targeting India.

Taken together, arrests, confessions, and intelligence reports indicate that the Pakistan–ISIS nexus poses serious risks to regional stability. In South Asia, ISIS-K’s growing capability — and its intent to target American interests — warrant significant concern for the United States. Safe havens in Pakistan provide the group with operational depth, redundancy, and access to broader recruitment pools. 

Yet Pakistan continues to enjoy Major Non-NATO Ally status with Washington, a designation that confers significant military and security cooperation benefits. As these networks remain entrenched, it is increasingly clear that Pakistan is not a reliable partner, but a problematic node within the broader threat landscape — one that warrants a serious reevaluation of its privileged alliance status.