Dipu Chandra Das, 27, worked 12-hour shifts at a garment factory outside Dhaka, checking pants and shirts for global brands for $150 a month salary of $150. On December 19, during a religious debate with co-workers in the closing hours of his Thursday shift, some claimed the Hindu garment worker commented on superstitions that his Muslim colleagues interpreted as blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad.

They dragged him into the street and an angry mob grew. They beat him to death, tied his body to a tree, and set it on fire. When his brother Opu arrived at the scene late that night, Mr. Das’s body lay bloodied and burned in the street as security forces struggled to hold back the mob from further desecration. Only a handful of family members dared attend his cremation the following evening, fearing they too could be targeted.

The brutal lynching crystallized fears about the dangerous trajectory of Bangladesh sixteen months after student-led protests toppled the woman prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, in August 2024. 

The interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus faces mounting challenges as it attempts to steer the South Asian nation of 176 million – which is 90 percent Muslim – toward democratic elections scheduled for February 2026 while grappling with resurgent Islamist extremism and systematic attacks on religious minorities, primarily Hindus.

What began as a youth movement demanding civil service reforms evolved into a mass uprising that forced Ms. Hasina – the daughter of Bangladesh’s founding prime minister – to flee to India on August 5, 2024, after security forces killed approximately 1,400 protesters. Yet what appeared to be a spontaneous revolution has since laid bare a more complex reality. 

“What we now know is that there was a huge element of the Jamaat-e-Islami student wing behind it, and they’re now coming out of the woodwork and taking ownership,” professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, Christine Fair, tells the Sun.

The Extremism Resurgence

The most alarming development, some say, has been the resurgence of Islamist militant groups.  

“Immediately after the government fell, many top terrorists in prison were released, granted bail in an expedited manner,” counterterrorism expert and former Bangladeshi diplomat, Noor Wahiduzzaman, tells the Sun. 

For one, the spiritual leader of Bangladesh’s al-Qaeda affiliate, Ansar al-Islam, Jashimuddin Rahmani, was in prison before the government change, but was then released. 

Bangladesh’s interim authorities released at least 140 Islamists — including Mr. Rahmani — primarily on bail or through withdrawn cases, arguing many had been jailed under politically motivated terrorism charges by the previous government. 

Separately, hundreds of inmates – many of whom were accused of Islamic extremism – escaped during prison unrest amid the political upheaval.

The releases and escapes quickly translated into a collapse of internal security, with critics claiming that extremist networks exploited the vacuum left by a suddenly paralyzed state. 

“On the day the government collapsed, mobs — mostly Islamist radicals — attacked and vandalized roughly 500 police stations in the country,” Mr. Wahiduzzaman recalled. “To put this in context, Bangladesh has around 630 police stations in total. As an analyst, it is clear these were coordinated attacks, under one central command, with the goal of weakening law enforcement first.”

Authorities report 5,800 firearms and 300,000 rounds of ammunition were stolen from police stations.

“The government could not recover most of the stolen weapons and ammunition, which poses a serious risk as the election approaches,” Mr. Wahiduzzaman explained. “In the first four months of this government alone, there were almost 2,400 attacks on minorities, mostly by Jamaat-e-Islami and groups connected to the government through student leaders.”

Bangladesh specialist at Australian National University, Tom Kean, distinguishes between Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh, known as HBT, a banned Islamist group that promotes a caliphate through ideological and political mobilization but typically avoids direct violence, and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, JMB, a designated terrorist organization with a long record of bombings and armed attacks aimed at imposing Sharia rule.

“HBT is a radical organization but generally does not employ violence, whereas JMB has a long history of employing violence,” Mr. Kean tells the Sun. “There are concerns in Bangladesh about the growing influence of right-wing organizations, particularly Islamist movements. Counterterrorism surveillance of violent organizations has not been as robust since Sheikh Hasina’s government fell.”

For Mr. Wahiduzzaman, those trends reflect a more profound shift in power. 

“It is very clear that radical Islamist forces drive this government. There’s no doubt about that in my mind,” he tells the Sun. “This government has many power centers, and one of those power centers is certainly the Islamist fundamentalists.”

The political transformation, too, has been dramatic. 

“The polling that I’ve seen on Jamaat is really quite spectacular, and depending on which poll you’re looking at, they’re neck and neck with the BNP. This is completely unprecedented in the history of Bangladesh,” Ms. Fair tells the Sun.

For analysts, the surge raises a deeper question about what has driven voters toward Islamist movements once relegated to the margins. 

According to Mr. Kean, the answer lies less in ideology than in disillusionment. 

“It is largely because they have lost trust in secular politicians,” he explained. “This is not only because of the actions of the Awami League last July–August, but because of the way politics has been conducted for decades in Bangladesh.”

Under Sheikh Hasina, critics say the Awami League – the then-ruling political party she led – increasingly relied on repression rather than reform — hollowing out democratic institutions, politicizing the courts and security services, crushing opposition parties, and using counterterrorism laws to silence dissent. 

That approach delivered short-term stability, but at the cost of legitimacy, analysts argue, leaving a vacuum that Islamist groups have been quick to exploit by presenting themselves as disciplined, moral alternatives to a political class many Bangladeshis now view as corrupt and authoritarian.

Religious Minorities Under Siege

The recent lynching of Mr. Das, however, was not isolated. The Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council reported 2,442 incidents of violence against minorities over 330 days following August 5, 2024. India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated that 76 incidents of anti-Hindu violence occurred between November and January, with 152 temples allegedly desecrated.

“Almost 2,500 attacks on minorities since December last year,” said Mr. Wahiduzzaman, identifying perpetrators as “mostly Islamist fundamentalists — Jamaat-e-Islami and others connected to the government through student leaders.”

“Hindu teachers and employees are being forced to resign. Mobs attack workplaces and force resignations; hundreds of these videos exist,” he continued. “The government has done almost nothing. In some cases, they even justified mob violence, calling mobs  ‘pressure groups.’ This government uses mobs as a coercive tool instead of law enforcement.”

Cultural targets have also suffered unprecedented attacks. 

“More than 100 Sufi shrines and mazars were vandalized last year, which is unprecedented,” Mr. Wahiduzzaman underscored. “Bangladesh’s Islam has traditionally been moderate and tolerant, rooted in Sufism — the most spiritual and moderate form. Yet Sufis are now being targeted.”

The attacks also fit into a broader, more complex pattern of communal tension in the country.

“There have been attacks on minorities, for sure, ever since the so-called monsoon revolution,” he said. “Having said this, attacks were occurring on minorities even during Sheikh Hasina’s time. So this has a much longer history than some people would like you to believe.”

A Compromised Democratic Transition

Amid the turmoil, elections are scheduled for February 12, 2026, with nearly 128 million eligible voters. The electoral landscape, however, has been compromised by the interim government’s ban on all Awami League activities until trials are complete for alleged crimes against humanity.

“I’m not a fan of banning the Awami League from the election. I’m perfectly fine with banning specific individuals, but banning the Awami League from the election — especially when this parliament is going to be tasked with constitutional reform—I think it’s an ethically terrible refuge,” observed Ms. Fair. 

Mr. Kean echoes these concerns. 

“I would not personally advocate for banning a political party, both for normative reasons and because it tends not to work: Hasina did the same thing to Jamaat-e-Islami, and it is now more popular than ever,” he said. “The temporary ban on the Awami League has disenfranchised millions of people who still support the party and may have pushed its more committed activists toward violence.”

There are also lingering fears that the worst of the mayhem may still lie ahead. 

“This election could be very violent,” Mr. Wahiduzzaman cautioned. “If you exclude 30 to 40 percent of the population from mainstream society, if you marginalize them, then there is every possibility the country could move toward civil unrest, civil conflict, or even civil war.”

The upcoming elections, some stress, may also determine whether Bangladesh transitions to democratic governance or slides deeper into extremism. 

“This election is likely to be very violent. If 30 to 40 percent of the population is excluded or marginalized, there is a real possibility the country could spiral into civil unrest, conflict, or even civil war,” Mr. Wahiduzzaman added.