LONDON – It could be any employment contract setting out salary, paid holidays, home leave, and grievance procedures – except in this case the employer is Al Qaeda and the recruit’s job is “carrying out jihad.”

By signing the contract, the recruit commits himself to Al Qaeda’s objectives: “Support God’s religion, establishment of Islamic rule, and restoration of the Islamic Caliphate, God willing.”

An Al Qaeda “mujahed brother” is paid a monthly wage of 1,000 Pakistani rupees (about $17 at current rates) if a bachelor, 6,500 rupees ($113) if married, with an additional 500 rupees ($9) for every child.

Airfares for home leave are paid for by the firm. Tickets cannot be cashed in but are transferable for performing the Haj pilgrimage.

The contract is one of thousands of documents captured by American forces, mostly in Afghanistan and Iraq during the past four years of the “global war on terror,” and stored on a Pentagon database known as Harmony.

An initial sample of 28 have been declassified and published by the Combating Terrorism Centre, part of the Military Academy at West Point, with the promise of many more to come.

They provide a fascinating glimpse into the workings of Osama bin Laden’s organization. For example, according to the CTC, the material “provides several tools for identifying and exacerbating existing fissures” within Al Qaeda.

The declassified Harmony papers include documents that set out the internal structure of Al Qaeda and illuminate disputes over tactics.They also analyze past failures such as the crushing of an Islamist uprising in Syria in 1982, speculate on new regions for jihad and discuss the use of the Internet.

Many were clearly written before the September 2001 attacks and the fall of the Taliban. However, some reveal dismay over the loss of Al Qaeda’s bastion in Afghanistan.

One hitherto unknown writer, Abdel-Halim Adl, wrote to a man identified only as “Mukhtar” in June 2002 complaining of Mr. bin Laden’s stubbornness and “the capture of a large number of brothers.” He said: “We will become the laughing stock of the world.”

He urges Al Qaeda to “stop rushing into action and take time out to consider all the fatal and successive disasters that have afflicted us during a period of no more than six months”. All too often little is known about the documents – such as when they were written, who read them and how they were obtained.

Nevertheless, West Point academics argue that they add significantly to the body of knowledge about Al Qaeda. “The overwhelming majority of the documents, to the best of our knowledge, have not been publicly available,” the CTC director of research, Jarret Brachman, said.

The Harmony database is also the subject of dispute in Congress over demands that tape recordings of Saddam Hussein be fully released.

The most striking Harmony documents so far are those that reveal Al Qaeda’s personnel policies. The “employment contract” lists many requirements of recruits: obedience, secrecy, avoiding all links to other groups, being physically healthy, having integrity on matters of religion and morality and reciting the pledge to Al Qaeda. This includes: “I pledge by God’s creed to become a Muslim soldier to support God’s religion, and may God’s word be the most supreme.”

The contract is of unknown origin but matches a draft of Al Qaeda “by-laws.”

This stipulates extra pay of 700 rupees a month for each additional wife as well as 20,000 rupees for married members to buy furniture, free health care, and rehabilitation for the disabled.

The by-laws describe Al Qaeda’s organization, headed by an “emir” and a “command council,” which in turn oversee an “external relations branch” and “executive council,” a military committee,” a “security committee,” and a “political committee.”

Similar documents state that the military committee has a special “nuclear weapons” section, but there are no further details on this.

The job descriptions and qualities of Al Qaeda members are set out in detail. To qualify as “emir,” the leader (presumably Mr. bin Laden) should not be “too anxious to be an emir,” must have “adequate knowledge to qualify him to carry out the responsibilities” and must have “comprehension of jihad.”

The chairman of the military committee must be, among other things, older than 40 and “a university graduate, preferably from a military academy.” The head of the personal guards “must not be one from one of the Gulf countries or from Yemen,” perhaps reflecting a fear of penetration by intelligence services.

One bundle of documents includes a long series of questions submitted by recruits to Mr. bin Laden, usually referred to as Sheik Abu Abdallah. They range from appeals for news about jihadi action to requests for religious rulings.

It is unclear how much of this formal structure reflects the reality of Al Qaeda in its heyday and whether any of it has survived the dispersal from Afghanistan.

If Al Qaeda were once regarded by western intelligence agencies as a “holding company” for Islamic extremist groups, the leadership hiding along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan is now seen merely as a “franchise.”

The “core” Al Qaeda no longer directs operations, but splinters, associates and newly formed groups adopt the “brand.”

Al Qaeda, meaning “the Base,” has recreated its home in cyberspace, from where propagandists motivate recruits and commanders share tactics.

Mr. Brachman said he “strongly” believes that some extremists groups, such as Al Qaeda’s branch in Saudi Arabia or Jemaah Islamiya in Southeast Asia, still use formal contracts.

Al Qaeda’s attention to publicity and the potential of the Internet are apparent from an early date.

A memo to Mr. bin Laden penned by “Abu Huthayfa” in Kandahar in June 2000 stresses the importance of a better propaganda effort. He praises Mr. bin Laden as a “star”, but complains that Al Qaeda suffers from “a political vacuum.”

He bemoans the lack of information about Al Qaeda’s role in driving America out of Somalia, the failure to launch the “World Islamic Front against the Jews and Crusaders,” and ignorance as to who was behind the 1998 bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

He says Al Qaeda should copy the tactics of Hamas in recording a video testament before suicide bombings.

Abu Huthayfa highlights a recurring obsession of the jihadi movement: its failure to win popular support and overthrow any Arab regime.

He notes the “failure of the experiment” in holy war in Libya.

Failure is the central theme of Abu Musab al-Suri, the nom-de-guerre of Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, particularly his detailed analysis of the Islamist uprising in Syria that was crushed by the late Hafez al-Assad in 1982.

This document has been seen on the Internet, but CTC researchers say its importance has been underestimated.

They use it to recommend a series of counter-measures, from planting disinformation on the Internet to supporting Al Qaeda’s ideological rivals.

Mr. al-Suri, who has Spanish citizenship, is reported to have been arrested in Pakistan last November. He was accused of running a training camp in Afghanistan, experimenting with chemical weapons and setting up sleeper cells in Europe.

The Syrian uprising that he describes was crushed when the Baathist regime in Damascus leveled parts of the town of Hama in 1982, killing thousands.

But Mr. al-Suri identifies many crippling problems, including: leaders engaged in political infighting rather than the jihad; lack of Islamic instruction for fighters; and dependence on outside financing.

“Despite the heroic acts of the mujahideen they failed miserably,” he writes.”Their only accomplishment was to prove their readiness for martyrdom.”

Terms of Employment Contract

AL QAEDA

An Islamic group with an aim of Jihad.

ITS BELIEFS

* The faith of Sunna and Jama’a (group) in general, and in detail following the example of the worthy ancestors.

OBJECTIVES

* To support God’s religion, establishment of Islamic rule, and restoration of the Islamic Caliphate, God willing.

SPHERE OF ACTIVITY

* International and transitional.

JOINING REQUIREMENTS

* Abiding by Al Qaeda rules, its beliefs and objectives.

* Obedience to the leaders as much as possible, without disobeying Islamic rules.

* No connection between Al Qaeda membership and any other Islamic group.

* Maintain secrecy.

* Be physically healthy (except in administrative work).

* The candidate should not be in question when it comes to religion, integrity or his morality.

VACATIONS

* The married have a vacation by rotation for a week every three weeks. Al Qaeda may deny this vacation for four months.

* A bachelor can have a vacation by rotation for five days every month. Al Qaeda may deny his request in certain cases.

* Request for vacation travel should be submitted two and a half months before travel date. The request would only be considered if it had been submitted in a timely manner.

SALARIES AND TICKETS

* The salary of a married Mujahed brother is 6,500 Pakistani Rupee, and 500 for every newborn.

* Salary of the bachelor Mujahed is 1,000 Rupee.

* The bachelor Mujahed qualifies for a round-trip ticket to his country after one year. He can take a one-month vacation. He doesn’t get reimbursed if the ticket is not used but has the right to change it to a ticket to perform pilgrimage. This period starts from the date of joining.

* The married Mujahed and his family qualify for round trip tickets to country of origin after two years, and one month vacation. Tickets cannot be reimbursed if unused.

* The brother who wants to leave without a legitimate excuse does not qualify for financial assistance or any of the previously mentioned privileges.

Questions for Osama bin Laden

These are questions to Osama bin Laden from Al Qaeda members dated September 2000. No responses are included.

* I owe some debt to Muslims back home and I came to the land of Jihad after a friend promised to pay this debt. I don’t know whether he did or not. Should I go to the frontline or not because I am not sure of this matter?

* There are infidels in Pakistan and India, of Christians and others. Is it okay for us to kill them and take their possessions and properties? Is it okay to steal from the infidels residing the Islamic and non-Islamic countries?

* Does the freedom fighter faces his creator in his tomb if he goes out for jihad and dies as a result of a snake bite or a kick of mule?

* You mentioned once that a front will open in Uzbekistan, but we heard nothing about it afterwards. Will this front open soon or not?

* Why there isn’t enough personal weapons (Kalashnikov) in the camp for all the fighters even for self defense, particularly there is a possibility of an attack by global infidel countries at any time?

* I live in Europe because I was born there. What is the ruling on stealing their possessions and killing them in their homes?

* I have a nephew who commits the big sins but he loves you and wishes to join the Jihad movement to atone for his sins. What is the best way to bring him here?