Hezbollah has built one of the most sophisticated hybrid criminal-terrorist enterprises on earth. Its drug-fueled revenue streams — cocaine from Latin America, Captagon from the ruins of Syria, and money-laundering networks that snake through four continents — now generate billions of dollars annually. 

That money buys precision-guided missiles, pays fighters, funds an elaborate social-welfare empire inside Lebanon, and keeps overseas cells active from Buenos Aires to Bangkok.

With Iran’s economy battered by sanctions, the Assad regime gone, and Lebanese authorities finally cracking down on once-protected smuggling clans, Hezbollah’s dependence on narco-dollars has become existential. 

“Hezbollah is strapped for cash. They need money to survive. Wherever they can get it, they’ll go for it,” a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, David Daoud, tells The New York Sun. “If Latin America is the easiest avenue right now, that may be their lifeline — and we’re not even looking at it.”

The group, however, rarely touches the product itself. Its genius lies in distance and deniability. 

“There is nothing in open source that directly links Hezbollah to the drug trade,” Mr. Daoud noted. “They don’t operate that way. They actually operate in a smarter way that makes it much harder to pin them down.”

Latin America: From Diaspora Charity to Narco-Facilitation

The foundation was laid decades ago by Lebanese Shiites fleeing the civil war. Legitimate trading houses, charities, and remittances created perfect cover. By the early 2000s, the shift was unmistakable: Hezbollah operatives were leveraging those same diaspora networks to facilitate cocaine trafficking and launder the proceeds.

“They act as facilitators,” Mr. Daoud explained. “They tap into channels that already exist, especially if those running them are Lebanese Shiites. There’s a natural symbiosis between the Shiite community in Lebanon and the Shiite expatriate communities in Latin America. This allows Hezbollah to benefit while maintaining plausible deniability.”

Cartels grow, cut, and move the cocaine. Hezbollah provides protection, forged documents, or secure transit corridors in exchange for a percentage, usually delivered in cash that is almost impossible to trace. 

“Imagine $5,000 in cash from a drug deal,” Mr. Daoud continued. “You give it to someone with ‘clean hands,’ they go to Western Union and send it to someone in Lebanon who also looks clean. Is it going to their grandmother or to Hezbollah? Hard to know without more scrutiny.”

Venezuela has been the linchpin. The Maduro regime has issued genuine Venezuelan passports to Hezbollah operatives, granted landing rights to Mahan Air, an IRGC front, and disregarded “narco-flights” departing Simon Bolivar International Airport. A single disrupted attempt in January 2025 — in which several tons of Colombian cocaine was to be traded for illicit arms — was only the visible tip. 

“Hezbollah-linked networks are seeking to ramp up illicit operations as a way of both reducing their dependence on Iran and generating alternative revenue streams,” the director of military and national security priorities at the New Lines Institute, Caroline Rose, tells the Sun. 

“The two hubs of likely activity are Latin America and West Africa, where local ties to Iran amongst countries like Venezuela; a strong diaspora in countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Côte d’Ivoire; and conducive conditions for criminality enable collaboration with Hezbollah.”

Captagon: The Syrian Money Machine That Just Broke

For years, the real cash cow was Captagon. Under Bashar al-Assad, Syria became the world’s largest producer of the amphetamine pill, churning out tens of millions monthly in regime-controlled factories. Hezbollah, too, was intimately involved.

“Hezbollah’s closest ally in Syria was the regime’s Fourth Armored Division — commanded by President Bashar Al-Assad’s brother, Maher,” Ms. Rose said. 

“Hezbollah and the regime coordinated cross-border routes, ports of entry and departure for consignments, and the establishment of a string of small-scale and large-scale laboratories, most of which were along the Lebanese-Syrian border.”

The profits were staggering and the protection absolute — until December 2024, when the regime collapsed overnight. 

“With the collapse of the Assad regime and the new Syrian authorities trying to clamp down on Captagon production and smuggling, that inevitably cuts down Hezbollah’s revenue — the ‘cut’ they take,” Mr. Daoud noted.

The new transitional authorities view Captagon as the ultimate symbol of Assad-era corruption and have demolished labs, arrested producers, and sealed routes. 

“It is clear that in the wake of the regime’s fall in December 2024, several regime officials and family members, some of whom were engaged in Captagon production and other illicit activities, like Wassim Badia Al-Assad, were given safe harbor in Hezbollah-controlled areas,” Ms. Rose said.

“It’s possible that collaboration between the two groups has continued in Lebanon, though on a smaller scale, as Hezbollah has been weakened and the Lebanese government is seeking to crack down on criminality.”

Mr. Wassim is a cousin of Bashar. 

The Lebanese crackdown has been dramatic. Powerful Shiite smuggling clans — families like the Zeaiters who once operated with impunity — are now being arrested or killed in army raids. 

“We have seen a major crackdown on Hezbollah-protected and affiliated criminal syndicates, such as prominent kingpin families like the Zeaiters,” Ms. Rose said. “The similar crackdown taking place in neighboring Syria has been a signal for these criminal networks to shift operations elsewhere, both beyond the Levant and the Middle East as a whole.”

A Model Built on Plausible Deniability, Now Under Siege

Hezbollah’s domestic blueprint is identical to the one it exports: Pre-existing criminal families traffic the drugs as Hezbollah offers protection and takes tribute — cash, intelligence, or both — while keeping its own hands technically clean. The same formula has worked in the Triple Frontier, in West African diamond ports, and in European used-car dealerships.

The noose around Hezbollah is tightening but Ms. Rose warns that Western countermeasures are myopic. 

“Currently, the primary focus has been on Hezbollah and Hezbollah-aligned networks operating within Lebanon and the Middle East, rather than network analysis that links Hezbollah’s relationships with other illicit networks, such as cartel and mafia groups in Europe, Latin America, and West Africa,” she said.

 “The U.S. and its partners should seek to analyze Hezbollah’s evolving criminal partnerships further to identify potential new trends in their modus operandi, money laundering techniques, and potential profits.”

With Syrian factories shuttered, Lebanese clans hunted, and Iran’s subsidies unreliable, Latin America suddenly looks like the last wide-open frontier. Far from Israeli drones and Drug Enforcement Administration task forces fixated on the Levant, the continent offers distance, diaspora cover, and corrupt partners eager for cash.

“Hezbollah is desperate for money right now, especially funds that are untraceable,” Mr. Daoud said. “If the drug trade is lucrative in Latin America, and Lebanon is clamping down domestically, they can generate more revenue from Latin America, which is far from Israeli or American scrutiny.”

As another winter war looms, the real battlefield for Hezbollah’s survival may not be southern Lebanon at all. It may be the coca fields of Colombia, the clandestine airstrips of Venezuela, and the quiet Western Union counters of São Paulo and Ciudad del Este — places where a terrorist army is quietly rebuilding its treasury, one untraceable envelope at a time.

“Wherever they can get it, they’ll go for it,” Mr. Daoud said.