Trump Fires the Inspectors General
Good for him, we say, as these pests are eating away at separated powers.

In respect of President Trump’s firing of Inspector Generals, why is the Congress the only branch of our government that gets to impose these spies on its competing branches? Remember, these IGs are placed in the executive branch, even, sometimes, against the wishes of the individual in whom is vested the entirety of executive power. These spies, or ‘watchdogs,’ then get to report back to Congress — separation of powers be damned.
Our view is similar to President Trump’s on this head — and has been for years. The IGs are like pests eating away at the most important check on our government, separated powers. Constitutionally, Americans would be better served were the whole idea of inspector generals cashiered. If, after all, IGs are going to be permitted to the Congress, the logical response is for each branch to set up IGs to spy on the other two branches.
That is, Mr. Trump, solely in whom is vested the executive power, would get to place inspectors general in the Congress reporting back to him. Another could sit in on, say, conferences of the Supreme Court, where he could keep an eye on, say, Justice Elena Kagan. If she gets up to her old tricks, he could report back to the president, who might alert the IGs similarly embedded in the Congress — say, in Senator Schumer’s private office.
Critics of Mr. Trump’s move against inspectors general seem all too willing to overlook these risks to the balance of powers among the constitutional branches. Feature, say, Senator Schiff, whose Javert-like obsession with Mr. Trump’s foibles has in the past blurred the lines between the legislative branch, whose job it is to make the laws, and the executive branch, which is tasked with enforcing them by investigating and prosecuting wrongdoing.
Mr. Schiff argues that Mr. Trump “broke the law” when he cashiered some 18 inspectors general, in part because the president did not provide Congress with 30 days notice of his intention to remove the watchdogs. Senator Warren gripes that the firing amounted to “a purge of independent watchdogs in the middle of the night.” The senator of Massachusetts accuses Mr. Trump of “dismantling checks on his power.”
The solons seem to be reenacting separated powers debates, going back to President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment, that have been largely settled in favor of the president. In 2020, in Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Supreme Court found that the agency’s chief “must be removable by the President at will,” echoing Madison’s view that executive power was synonymous with “a power to oversee executive officers through removal.”
Pointing to Seila Law, Berkeley’s John Yoo tells Newsweek that “President Trump is well within his power to remove members of the executive branch at will,” because “Congress could not protect officers of the United States from removal by the President.” Even so, Seila Law does make note of an exception allowing Congress to give “removal protection for an inferior officer,” as Chief Justice Roberts explained, based on the Morrison v. Olson precedent.
That case centered on an independent counsel named by the Congress to investigate the president. The Nine in 1988 upheld it, over the objection of The Great Scalia, because, as Chief Justice Roberts later described the court’s reasoning, an independent counsel, having but “narrow authority to initiate criminal investigations and prosecutions of Governmental actors identified by others,” does not infringe on the president’s power.
Could the position of inspector general be viewed in a similar light, in the event that the dispute over Mr. Trump’s mass firing emerges as a legal tussle? That traversal of the separated powers would distort the Framers’ “constitutional strategy,” as Chief Justice Roberts defined it in Seila Law: “Divide power everywhere except for the Presidency, and render the President directly accountable to the people through regular elections.”