Iran Intelligence Chief’s Demotion Seen as Evidence of Israeli Infiltration

Israel is not only stopping Iranian terrorism: It is also hitting the designers and planners of such attacks more frequently and more brazenly than in the past.

Necati Savas, pool via AP
The Israeli and Turkish foreign ministers, Yair Lapid and Mevlut Cavusoglu, at Ankara June 23, 2022. Necati Savas, pool via AP

Iran, in a move seen falling just short of conceding defeat in its shadow war against Israel, has demoted one of its most powerful intelligence officers. 

Speculation about the fate of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ intelligence chief, Hossein Taeb, swirled in Israel for days before the Islamic Republic’s state-run television finally announced the ill-kept secret this morning.

A lower-level IRGC intelligence officer, Mohammad Kazemi, will replace Mr. Taeb at the head of the powerful intelligence operation, which operates separately from, and is widely considered more powerful than, the national spy agency.   

Established in 2009, the IRGC intelligence unit was created by Supreme Leader Khamenei as part of an effort to increase redundancy among security agencies, which would allow his office more control over Iran’s spy operations at home and abroad. 

“The redundancy and overlap in the authorities of the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization have created disagreements and competition over prestige between the two bodies,” an Iran watcher at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, Raz Zimmt, wrote recently. 

In recent years, according to Mr. Zimmt, the IRGC’s intelligence unit became stronger and more influential than the ministry of intelligence — not least for political reasons, as “the IRGC agency reports directly to the supreme leaders, whereas the intelligence ministry reports to the president,”  Mr. Zimmt told the Sun. 

Mr. Taeb’s dismissal, therefore, is widely seen as a major shuffle at the very top of Iran’s intelligence and terror-exporting mechanism. It also points to a tacit acknowledgement of the agency’s recent failures. 

At the same time that the news of Mr. Taeb’s dismissal broke, the Israeli foreign minister, Yair Lapid, was at Ankara, where Turkish authorities announced that they foiled an Iranian plot to assassinate Israeli diplomats and tourists on Turkish soil. Ten alleged Iranian spies were arrested.

Mr. Lapid and his Turkish counterpart, Mevlut Cavusoglu, hailed intelligence cooperation between the two countries, which have been at odds for years. Both ministers denounced the Islamic Republic. 

“Iran is behind these attempted terrorist attacks,” Mr. Lapid tweeted. “We’re not only talking about the murder of innocent Israeli tourists, but also a clear violation of Turkish sovereignty by Iranian terror. No country should tolerate terror on its soil.”

As yet, Jerusalem has not removed a national advisory warning Israelis about traveling to Turkey. Yet, the mere fact that the warning was issued two weeks ago, and the strong suggestion that the Mossad tipped the Turkish authorities to the plots weeks ago, indicates the depth of Israel’s infiltration into Iran’s security bodies. 

With deep access into the innermost Iranian security centers, Israel is not only stopping Iranian terrorism: It is also hitting the designers and planners of such attacks more frequently and more brazenly than in the past. 

An IRGC commander responsible for terrorism operations outside the country, Colonel Sayyad Khodaei, was shot dead by a motorcyclist just outside his Tehran home. Additionally, last month Israel reportedly destroyed with drones a secret base where Iran was developing missile, nuclear, and drone technology. 

Prime Minister Bennett has promoted what he called the “octopus” approach to the shadow war against Iran. Rather than fighting Iran’s many arms — proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas — Mr. Bennett’s tactic is to attack the octopus’s head, Iran itself.

That approach takes a lot of intelligence, and Israel has increasingly shown its ability to infiltrate the highest echelons of Iran’s various bodies. That, partially, is likely what did in Mr. Taeb, as his leadership lost favor at Mr. Khamenei’s office. 

“Taeb’s departure is a symbol of the paranoia inside the regime,” a policy director at the think tank United Against Nuclear Iran, Jason Brodsky, said. Mr. Kazemi who replaced Mr. Taeb is a “shadowy character who is more focused on internal intelligence,” Mr. Brodsky told the Sun.

Mr. Kazemi will likely assume the usual IRGC intelligence unit’s duties. Yet, the new chief’s background as a domestic spy was undoubtedly on the Mr. Khamenei’s mind as he made the decision to replace Mr. Taeb.

Tehran is befuddled at how deeply it has been infiltrated. Last month Iran arrested three people it said were Mossad spies and it plans to soon put them on a show trial. While no evidence was made available, the trial, and likely consequent public hanging, is widely seen as an attempt to counter public perception that Israeli spies are everywhere and that Tehran is helpless in catching them. 

“A series of cyber attacks, sabotage, and assassinations has revealed that for a regime that obsesses over and prioritizes security, there may be less of it than meets the eye,” an Iran watcher at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Behnam Ben Taleblu, said. 

Regardless of the reality behind such public perception, the image of Iranian vulnerability is enough to weaken the mullahs. That, likely, was enough for Mr. Khamenei to demote a long-time adviser, ally, and friend, Mr. Taeb. 


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