Our Recession Obsession

This article is from the archive of The New York Sun before the launch of its new website in 2022. The Sun has neither altered nor updated such articles but will seek to correct any errors, mis-categorizations or other problems introduced during transfer.

The New York Sun

We are all waiting, it seems, for the next recession. Everyone knows that the business cycle hasn’t been repealed, and so another recession is inevitable sooner or later. Some indicators now suggest that it might be sooner.

The Conference Board’s consumer confidence index has declined for three straight months. In March, 30% of respondents said jobs are “plentiful”; now that’s only 24%. All this inspires much foreboding, because a recession is widely regarded as a calamity, or something close to it.

Just last week, the Federal Reserve cut its key overnight interest rate for the second time since August. It now stands at 4.5%, down from its recent peak of 5.25%.

Although the economy grew at a strong 3.9% annual rate in the third quarter, most economists regard this as an aberration. They expect slower growth or a recession, because three powerful forces are now assaulting the economic expansion.

First, housing. Its collapse deepens. Economist Richard Berner of Morgan Stanley notes that sales of new and existing homes have dropped 42% and 30%, respectively, from their peaks of more than two years ago. As supplies of unsold homes grow, real estate prices continue to fall. One index finds that prices in August were down 4.4% nationally from a year earlier.

Second, oil prices. They’re approaching $100 a barrel. Even before the latest price increases, energy costs rose to 6.2% of consumer spending in the second quarter from 4.5% in 2002, notes consultant Jack Lavery, a former chief economist of Merrill Lynch. Higher energy costs will continue to weaken purchasing power for other goods and services, he says.

Third, credit problems. As lenders and investors have suffered losses on subprime mortgages — loans to weaker borrowers — they’ve tightened lending standards for other borrowers. With the economy slowing, Diane Vazza of Standard & Poor’s expects bond defaults to rise among shakier corporate borrowers, especially companies dependent on strong consumer spending — retailers, fast-food chains, entertainment firms.

Countering these powerful downward economic pressures are strong export growth, up at a 16% annual rate in the third quarter, and increased federal government spending, up 7%. The economy’s fate hangs heavily on the outcome of this tug-of-war. Meanwhile, what’s missing from all the agonizing about a possible recession is a sense of proportion.

Of course, no one likes the usual side effects of a recession: higher unemployment, weaker profits, more stress. Still, popular rhetoric exaggerates the damage. By and large, recessions are problems, not tragedies.

Since World War II, there have been 10 of them, or one about every six years. On average, they’ve lasted 10 months, indeed, a common definition of a recession is at least two quarters of declining output. Disregarding two severe recessions — those of 1973-1975 and 1981-1982 — peak monthly unemployment has averaged 7.1%.

Recessions also have often-overlooked benefits. They dampen inflation. In weak markets, companies can’t easily raise prices, nor workers’ wages.

Similarly, recessions punish reckless financial speculation and poor corporate investments. Bad bets don’t pay off. These disciplining effects contribute to the economy’s long-term strength, but it seems cold-hearted to say so because the initial impact is hurtful.

Today, a U.S. recession might also reverse the upward spiral of oil prices and trigger a faster — and healthier — drop in home prices. As economist Berner notes, the slow decline in prices prolongs the housing slump, because it induces “would-be buyers [to] wait for more attractive deals.” By making homes more affordable, a quick and sharp price drop might revive housing more rapidly.

“Moral hazard” is now a much-bandied-about phrase. Its initial meaning stems from insurance: If you overinsure someone against risk, you may encourage undesirable behavior. Example: Cheap flood insurance will spur home building along vulnerable coasts.

The Fed faces a similar problem. If it tries too hard to prevent a recession — through easy-money policies — investors, businesses, and workers may conclude they have nothing to fear. They may then engage in precisely the risky and inflationary behavior that makes matters worse, perversely “resulting in an even larger bubble and a larger subsequent recession,” warns economist John Makin of the American Enterprise Institute.

We’ve been there before. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Fed followed easy-credit policies on the belief that government could end recessions and constantly keep the economy close to “full employment.”

The bad behavior thus encouraged was inflationary wage and price increases by firms and workers relieved of the fear of recession.

The experiment boomeranged: Double-digit inflation ensued along with the savage 1973-1975 and 1981-1982 recessions (peak unemployment: 9%, 10.8%). The real “moral hazard” problem today is not starting down that path again.


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