When Inaction Is the Best Plan
This article is from the archive of The New York Sun before the launch of its new website in 2022. The Sun has neither altered nor updated such articles but will seek to correct any errors, mis-categorizations or other problems introduced during transfer.

It has been an exceptionally busy off-season, with Hall of Famers and All-Stars flying about like acrobats in complex trades and free agent deals. But it’s easy to forget that action and motion are not the same thing. The teams that acted the most, among them the A’s, Dodgers, and Yankees, did surprisingly little to improve themselves, while those that accomplished the least, like the Cubs and Phillies, rank among the safest bets to improve this year. Spending money and making headlines don’t make a ballclub good.
The Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, Ca., best prove the point. With a raft of bizarre and redundant moves, one has to wonder whether or not they have a copy of their own 40-man roster near to hand.
Going into the off-season, the Angels were facing what you might call a structural problem: an abundance of talent at the infield corners, and a dearth of talent in the outfield, given the need to exile reputed clubhouse cancer/rightfielder Jose Guillen. With top third base prospect Dallas MacPherson ready to take over the position from the departed Troy Glaus, top first base prospect Casey Kotchman nearly ready for the big leagues, and centerfielder Darin Erstad the incumbent at first base, an obvious sequence of moves presented itself: Trade Guillen for a new rightfielder, move Erstad back to center, and sign someone like Tino Martinez as a placeholder for Kotchman.
The first move went perfectly well, as the Angels traded Guillen for Juan Rivera, a younger, cheaper, and quite similar player. It was the second move that came straight out of the George Steinbrenner circa 1989 playbook – the team signed centerfielder Steve Finley, who turns 40 in March, to a two-year, $14 million deal.
Finley isn’t a bad player, but he’s not an especially good one, either. He’s a decent hitter, but an atrocious defender. Both the eyes and defensive statistics confirm that he plays his position about as well as you would expect from a 40-year-old, and in centerfield that costs a team a lot. Erstad, meanwhile, is a passable hitter and a superb defensive outfielder. In center, he’s an asset; at first, he’s a warm body. Signing Finley means keeping Erstad at first, blocking Kotchman this year, and weakening two positions.
The Angels also went out and signed Cuban defector Kendry Morales, a 21-year-old third baseman regarded as possibly the best position player ever to escape Fidel Castro’s wonderland, and Orlando Cabrera, a shortstop who makes three times as much and is no better than the man they already had under contract, David Eckstein. So to chalk up, the Angels now have two top-grade third base prospects; one old, semi-adequate centerfielder; one good centerfielder playing first base; one top-grade first base prospect with no position to play; and one shortstop who improves the team not a whit but costs a great deal of money.
This isn’t just a ridiculous situation in its own right, but characteristic of a mentality that grips many teams come fall and winter. Frenzied, they run about making deals with no evident purpose and to no evident ends.
The Yankees, for instance, somehow managed to add seven new players, most of them rather expensive, without ensuring even adequate performance from first base, second base, centerfield, or designated hitter. Should Jorge Posada start acting like the 33-year-old catcher he is and miss significant time with injuries, the Yankees might well be getting mediocre-to-horrible production from five lineup spots. The rotation isn’t as bad, but it is questionable, especially if Randy “Methuselah” Johnson’s achy back or rotted knee choose to act up.
Neither the Yankees nor the Angels are run by stupid men. What drives these moves is the fear of risk (“Erstad could get hurt in center, and if Kotchman doesn’t hit, then we have two bad positions – at least we know Finley’s going to stay in there.”) and the natural tendency of those who have money to spend it (“Cabrera was the starting shortstop for a World Series winner!” “So was Eckstein.” “Three years ago!”).
Better off by far are the Cubs, who have watched quietly as the Astros lost Jeff Kent and Carlos Beltran and the Cardinals gained Mark Mulder while losing pitcher Woody Williams, Edgar Renteria, and Mike Matheny. Chicago did little of note other than sign Nomar Garciaparra to a one-year,$8 million contract that might prove the biggest bargain of the offseason.
Perhaps they will trade Sammy Sosa; perhaps not. But finding no solutions on the market to their real needs in left field and in the bullpen, they will go into spring training hoping solutions will emerge from a group of veteran role players and prospects. The left field job, for instance, should be split between Jason DuBois, who posted a 1.019 OPS in Triple-A last year, and fourth outfielder Todd Hollandsworth, while young pitchers like Angel Guzman and Jon Leicester will be given the chance to solve the team’s relief problems.
If these solutions don’t work out, the team will look elsewhere during the season. Wisely seeing that improved health in the rotation and weaker competition give them breathing room, the Cubs have proved to be unafraid of risk and unwilling to spend money for the sake of spending it. That doesn’t grab headlines in January; it may well end up doing so in October.