Xi’s Military Purge in China Exposes a People’s Liberation Army Built on Graft, Corruption

In the latest salvo of Xi Jinping’s relentless campaign to root out corruption within China’s military, Beijing announced late last month that it was investigating the military’s second-highest officer and a childhood friend of Mr. Xi, General Zhang Youxia, along with Chief of Staff General Liu Zhenli. The shocking purge reduced the Central Military Commission to just two members — Mr. Xi and one disciplinary official — down from seven when they took office in 2022.The move comes after Beijing expelled nine senior People’s Liberation Army officials in October 2025, bringing the total number of purged officers to well over a hundred since the Chinese leader intensified his crackdown in 2023.The dismissals, which include generals from the Rocket Force, Navy, and strategic support units, have laid bare a military apparatus so riddled with graft that analysts are questioning whether the People’s Liberation Army could effectively wage war even as it projects power across the Indo-Pacific.The scale of the corruption is staggering. According to Chinese state media reports and leaked internal documents, the malfeasance extends from the top brass down through the ranks, touching everything from weapons procurement to personnel appointments. Officers have allegedly sold military positions like commodities, siphoned funds intended for equipment upgrades into private accounts, and created a parallel economy within the armed forces in which money, not merit, determines advancement.“Corruption is inherent to the PLA — it is how the PLA was built, gained influence, and how officers won promotions,” a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, Zack Cooper, tells The New York Sun. “Xi is not going to change that, certainly not quickly.”A Shadow Economy of Promotion and PrivilegeThe corruption reached its most dramatic exposure in the Rocket Force, the elite nuclear and conventional missile command that represents the crown jewel of China’s military modernization. Last year, Mr. Xi removed the force’s top two commanders, along with numerous deputy commanders and senior officers. Investigations revealed that officials had diverted billions of yuan intended for missile development and maintenance, raising alarming questions about the reliability of China’s nuclear deterrent.Intelligence reports from January 2024 found that water had been put in some Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles instead of fuel. According to sources familiar with the investigations, some Rocket Force officials sold sensitive postings, including positions at missile bases and command centers.Others falsified reports on equipment readiness and maintenance, creating, as one leaked document described, “empty silos and phantom capabilities.”Perhaps the most corrosive aspect of the PLA’s corruption culture has been the commodification of military rank itself. Multiple investigations have documented elaborate price lists for various positions and promotions, with senior commands reportedly costing millions of yuan.“Historically, the Chinese military has been extremely corrupt,” says the chairman of the board of the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security and chairman of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Randall Schriver. “It was expected that people would pay for their promotions. There was a time when I was covering the PLA, where our attachés could tell you how much each level (cost). How much does it cost to become a colonel? How much has it cost to become a major?” he tells the Sun.This pay-to-play system has profound implications for military effectiveness over the two-million strong active-duty forces. When officers purchase their positions rather than earn them through competence, combat commands go to those who can pay rather than those who can fight. Strategic planning is compromised by officials who prioritize protecting their investments over optimizing for military outcomes.Xi’s Purge Creates Operational ParalysisMr. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign within the military began in earnest after he consolidated power, positioning himself as a reformer determined to create a fighting force capable of achieving his geopolitical ambitions. The purges have accelerated dramatically since 2023, with five out of seven members of the Central Military Commission removed, along with three defense ministers and dozens of flag officers.“I think in the near-term the purges will impede the PLA’s operational capability,” Mr. Cooper says. “But I would caution that this would not prevent Beijing from using force if it had to.”The very scale of the crackdown raises uncomfortable questions. Many of the now-disgraced officials were promoted under Mr. Xi’s watch, some directly by him. Mr. Schriver suggests the purges serve multiple purposes beyond fighting corruption.“Most people would say the corruption is always there if you want to find it, so it becomes a convenient pretext if you want to get rid of somebody,” he explains.“The number of theories U.S. analysts will produce runs the full spectrum. Some will say this proves he’s large and in charge, in control of the PLA, and demanding results on readiness and preparedness for Taiwan. But then the other side of that spectrum is this is paranoia and anxiety about anybody who’s able to establish an alternate center of power.”The purges, however, have created operational disruptions within the PLA. Key positions have been vacant for months during investigations. Officers have become risk-averse, afraid that any decision might later be characterized as corrupt.“Imagine you’re the person picked to replace someone on the Central Military Commission,” Mr. Schriver notes. “How much innovation and entrepreneurial leadership would you want to show? Zero. They’re going to err very much on the side of caution.”Reassessing Chinese Military CapabilitiesDespite the revelations about equipment fraud and phantom readiness, Western analysts caution against dismissing the PLA’s capabilities entirely. Managing director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund, Bonnie Glaser, observes that while “the combination of widespread corruption and the removal of a large number of senior officers has likely reduced combat readiness,” the capability to conduct presence operations remains intact.“The PLA can continue to conduct large-scale military exercises around Taiwan,” Ms. Glaser tells the Sun, “but it is not prepared to launch an invasion.”She underscores that revelations about equipment fraud shouldn’t lead to the conclusion that the Chinese military hasn’t made significant strides. The Department of Defense’s annual report on developments in China’s military “makes clear that its progress is substantial even if gaps remain,” she says.A senior analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Jack Burnham, argues the upheaval reflects “an unprecedented effort to shape the Chinese military in the image of one man whose designs on China’s perceived future are increasingly clear.”“Seen from Washington, however, the upheaval should not obscure a clearer truth. The PLA is far from a paper tiger, and its capacity to project power within its own region remains formidable,” Mr. Burnham says.Perhaps the most troubling long-term implication is what Mr. Schriver describes as an authoritarian dilemma.“Nobody comes in with objective truth and speaks truth to power. If there’s an incident or an unintended accident, and there’s a spiraling escalation with little ability to really control the direction of things; who’s going to go in and give the cautionary message to Xi Jinping?”The only senior figure remaining on the Central Military Commission is a member of the Rocket Force, a career political commissar who heads the anti-corruption watchdog. This contributes to Mr. Xi’s promotion of political acuity within the military.“This is a true politicization like we haven’t seen before,” Mr. Schriver says. “What Xi is probably most worried about is anybody at any level, any echelon, who would think twice about an order, think twice about the worthiness of a cause like Taiwan.”Yet Mr. Cooper warns against concluding that the purges make conflict less likely.“Xi will pick PLA leaders who are willing to modernize quickly, which suggests that China’s use of force could be a more serious possibility down the line as a result,” he says. “The PLA has acted in the past regardless of whether it was fully prepared, so recent purges are simply a complication, not a complete impediment.”As Mr. Xi continues his purge with no signs of stopping, he faces a fundamental dilemma: he cannot afford a corrupt military that threatens his strategic objectives, but he also cannot afford the instability and capability gaps created by removing so many senior officers.“First, the purges are likely not only to deal with corruption. There is clearly a political objective as well,” Ms. Glaser highlights. “Xi Jinping’s strong control over the military is not in doubt — no one has challenged his removal of a very large number of generals.”Whether Mr. Xi can transform the PLA into the professional fighting force he envisions remains an open question — one with profound implications for regional security and global power balances.“I would not be at all surprised if we see more purges,” Mr. Schriver says. “It’s just been a pattern since 2012.”

Xi’s Military Purge in China Exposes a People’s Liberation Army Built on Graft, Corruption

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